[8][9] At 18:58 Japan Standard Time (JST), while cruising at flight level (FL) 33,000 feet (10,000 m) the first officer received the weather conditions at Hiroshima.

The captain, who was the pilot flying, gave an approach briefing, stating he intended to land on runway 10 using radar vectors from air traffic control (ATC).

The captain then gave a second briefing, saying that he would configure the aircraft for landing before reaching the final approach fix (FAF) and acknowledged the new information in the FMC.

After completing the landing checklist, the captain gave a go-around briefing, stating that TO/GA thrust would be used and the flaps would be retracted one position at a time.

Recovered flight data shows that, after autopilot disconnect, the aircraft began a slow and controlled descent below the normal glide slope approach path about 4 kilometres (2.5 mi; 2.2 nmi) before impact.

[2] At 20:04, the first officer made two more comments about the weather saying "ah, It looks a bit ambiguous due to cloud, sir," and "wow, getting invisible in a second," at 20:04:14 and 20:04:39 respectively.

The CVR recorded the following at this time: At 20:05:11, the captain initiated a go-around and pulled the side-stick to full nose aft.

[2] The captain stated to investigators that he had not lost sight of the runway during the approach, but initiated a go-around as an instrument showed the aircraft deviating to the right.

The report determined that the probable cause of the accident was the captain's failure to immediately initiate a go-around when visual cues were lost, the first officer's failure to challenge the captain's performance (both of which did not follow to Standard Operating Procedures), lack of crew resource management (CRM) and Asiana Airlines' insufficient training.