The subordinate leaders are given planning initiative and freedom of execution: they decide on the methods to achieve the objective independently.
For the success of mission-type tactics, the subordinate leaders must understand the orders' intent and be trained to act independently.
In armies which don't, as a whole, embody mission-style tactics, taking the risk of disobeying some orders or questioning limitations in the normal course of achieving a mission is sometimes associated with elite units, which sometimes foster a particular type of innovative culture which enables and rewards this behaviour.
Strictly speaking, the term Auftragstaktik grammatically appears to refer to a type of tactics, rather than a method of leadership and delegation.
Direct orders are an exception in the German military, and "tasks" are the standard instrument of leadership from the high command down to the squad level.
[8] As a crucial characteristic of this method of command and delegation, subordinate leaders must understand the intent of their orders, are given proper guidance and are trained to act independently.
Mission-type tactics assume the possibility of violating other previously expressed limitations in order to achieve a mission.
This style of command originates in a state (Prussia) that saw itself as small, surrounded by enemies and in imminent danger of destruction; the same may be said of Israel.
Throughout his career, at least until the Peninsular War, he demonstrated his ability to defeat any enemy by the greater flexibility of his units and through better deployment.
To enable this flexibility, the Prussian Army also sought to inculcate in General Staff Officers the ability to ensure that each military unit understood and executed its mission.
Frederick Charles did not much like the parts that he understood, was uncooperative under Moltke's orders, and disobeyed him several times.
But most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his senior commander's intent.Under the Auftragstaktik system, the selection of combat formations, as well as their route and rate of advance, was based upon a unit's mission, the terrain and the enemy's disposition, something Napoleon was renowned for doing.
Similarly, NCOs with cross-branch tactical experience ensured that these combined-arms teams did operate in an integrated fashion.
The German High Command (OKH) ran multiple exercises, or war games, in the 1930s starting with small operations and in later years involving very large formations and major movements to ensure doctrinal coherence and the opportunity to revise and learn.
The General Staff played a vital role in assuring the quality of these exercises and in ensuring that lessons were learnt and much of the philosophy was incorporated in its 1933 Field Manual Truppenführung.
That strongly suggests that long experience of operations allowed senior commanders to be quite abstract in their orders, which were issued without great fear of being misunderstood.
Once the commander's intent is understood, decisions must be devolved to the lowest possible level to allow these front line soldiers to exploit the opportunities that develop".
To understand what is happening at the point of action and to be able to take decisions quickly, the operational commander must be able to observe results.
The impact of the application of personal influence was thought to be critical and to be possible only because of the bench-strength provided by general staff officers managing in the formations' rear.