On the next day, XXX Corps in the west pushed south to Tilly-sur-Seulles, which was occupied by the Panzer-Lehr Division; the village was captured and re-captured several times.

The battle is controversial because many historians and writers have concluded that it was failures by British divisional and corps commanders that squandered an opportunity to capture Caen, rather than the Germans achieving a defensive success.

[5] Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing left of the Allied front to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River.

The 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division landed on Gold Beach on 6 June and was to rapidly move inland and capture Bayeux and the road to Tilly-sur-Seulles.

[11][12] The 47 Royal Marine Commando advanced westwards along the coast, to link up with the American forces moving inland from Omaha Beach but fell short of Port-en-Bessin-Huppain by 3 mi (4.8 km).

[13] On 7 June, the bulk of the 7th Armoured Division landed on schedule and XXX Corps secured its remaining D-Day objectives, including Bayeux and Port-en-Bessin-Huppain.

[31] By nightfall, the 7th Armoured Division had reached the north-western fringe of Tilly-sur-Seulles and next day penetrated the village, capturing the central crossroads.

Adolf Hitler over-ruled Rommel and the next day ordered him not to retreat and instead to roll up the Allied beachhead from east to west, starting with the Orne bridgehead.

To close the gap in the British perimeter, the decision was made to secure Bréville and the 12th Battalion the Parachute Regiment captured the village by midnight but had 141 casualties among 160 men in the attack.

Since D-Day, the British and Americans had destroyed five German battle groups in this area, including the reserves of LXXXIV Corps, leaving only remnants of the 352nd Infantry Division in the Trévières–Agy sector.

[39] On the night of 9/10 June, the 352nd Division received permission to retire to Saint-Lô, which created a 7.5 mi (12.1 km) gap in the German lines near Caumont-l'Éventé.

[d] General Hans Freiherr von Funck of XLVII Panzer Corps rushed the divisional reconnaissance battalion to Caumont, with orders to hold the high ground.

[45] The 2nd Company, schwere SS-Panzer Battalion 101, under the command of Michael Wittmann and with five operational Tiger tanks, was ordered to a position south of Point 213 on the Villers-Bocage ridge and arrived on 12 June, after a five-day drive from Beauvais.

[57][63][g] A squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters), moved through the town and occupied Point 213, an area of high ground to the east on the Caen road.

[69][70] The Tiger was immobilised by British return fire and was abandoned by the crew who fled towards Château Orbois to report to the Panzer-Lehr Division.

[72][73] During the rest of the morning, an infantry battalion from the 22nd Armoured Brigade group took up defensive positions in the town; the troops at Point 213 had been cut off and a force was assembled to extricate them.

[82] Hinde decided that the brigade group should withdraw until morning to Point 174, an area of high ground to the west of Villers-Bocage near Amayé-sur-Seulles.

[83] On the morning of 14 June, Montgomery abandoned the pincer attack on Caen, because he lacked "sufficient strength to act offensively on both flanks".

[89] The main attack began at 10:15 the next morning, when the 151st (Durham) Infantry Brigade and tanks of the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards, advanced towards Lingèvres and Verrières.

[88][93] Two Panthers were spotted approaching Lingèvres by Sergeant Wilfred Harris, commander of a Sherman Firefly, who engaged at 400 yd (370 m), destroying the first and disabling the second.

[94] While Harris moved, an infantry tank-hunting party, led by Major John Mogg (acting battalion commander of the 9th DLI) finished off the damaged Panther.

Nine German tanks were knocked out during the day but the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division had been unable to break through the Panzer-Lehr defences and the DLI suffered c. 353 casualties.

After a long artillery bombardment, simultaneous attacks from the north and south by tanks and infantry were made at 19:00, which broke into the box and closed on the brigade headquarters, before being driven back around 22:30.

[99][119] Reynolds called the German casualty figures "exaggerated" and in his report, Hinde wrote "It is questionable whether the expenditure of artillery and small arms ammunition was justified by the scale of the enemy's efforts".

In 2004, Carlo D'Este called Dempsey's comments "excessively harsh" but historians generally support them, suggesting that a great opportunity swiftly to capture Caen had been squandered by Bucknall.

[117][121][122] John Buckley wrote in 2006 that Bucknall was not ready to support the attack once problems developed and that Erskine was not capable of mastering the situation.

[128] Chester Wilmot called Operation Perch a strategic success, "By the premature commitment of his armour, Rommel had delayed the British advance, but in the process he had played into Montgomery's hands for, once the panzer divisions were locked into battle with Second Army, they could not be used for their proper offensive task".

The risk of a break-out past Caen immobilised the German armoured divisions at the east end of front, unable mount a counter-offensive against the First US Army.

Hitler's interference saved Rommel's military reputation because the unsuitability of the Cotentin for armoured operations, the difficulties involved in movement and supply in the area and the strength of the Anglo-Canadian force, would have led to a more rapid and complete defeat of the German army in Normandy.

By the end of June, the Panzer-Lehr Division had suffered 2,972 casualties and reported the loss of 51 tanks and assault guns, 82 half tracks and 294 other vehicles.