This page is subject to the extended confirmed restriction related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.The Azzam Pasha quotation was part of a statement made by Abdul Rahman Hassan Azzam, the Secretary-General of the Arab League from 1945 to 1952, in which he declared in 1947 that, were a war to take place with the proposed establishment of a Jewish state, it would lead to "a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacre and the Crusades.
"[1] The quote was universally cited for decades as having been uttered on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arab states several months later.
Azzam Pasha rejected this idea, warning in a report to Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Nuqrashi that the "destruction of the Jews by force is not a solution to the Palestine problem", as well arguing that since the Arab armies were dependent foreign countries for their supplies, the league didn't have to adopt "such extreme measure", since the powers wouldn't consent to an Arab war against the Jews.
In an interview with Le Progrès Egyptien on October 5th 1945, Azzam declared:"If you could assure me that the handing of Palestine to the Jews would mean peace everywhere, I should give all of it.
[3][7][8] The head of the Bloudan conference, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, would later deny in his memoirs responsibility for the secret protocols, which he was either unaware or opposed, except for the agreement to raise the Palestine issue in the UN Assembly.
[10][11] It wasn't until April of 1948, two weeks before the Mandate of Palestine was set to expire, that the Arab chiefs of staff met to plan an intervention.
[13] In December 1945 the head of the Arab department of the Jewish Agency Eliyahu Sasson met in Cairo with the former Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Mahir.
The then Prime Mininster Ismail Sidqi promised to endorse either partition or a bi-national solution in exchange for Zionist assistance in Egypt's disputes with the UK.
He can see fit to support partition on two conditions: If one of the Arab states will find the strength and the courage to take the initiative and to propose the matter at a meeting of the League, and if the British will request that he follow this line.
His Zionist interlocutors read this statement as a fascist declaration, unable, according to Henry Laurens, to see that, as with the Jews of Europe, emancipation from enslavement for the Arabs was seen as requiring recourse to force.
"[2][24]At the pan-Arab summit of 19 September 1947, which convened at Saoufar in Lebanon, the League decided to employ all available means to ensure the independence of Palestine as an Arab state.
On October 11, the editor of Akhbar el-Yom, Mustafa Amin, ran an interview he had obtained from Azzam Pasha to report on the outcome of the summit.
[25] A Jewish Agency memorandum, submitted on February 2, 1948, to the U.N. Palestine Commission, tasked with the implementation of the partition resolution, and yet again to the U.N. secretary-general on March 29, 1948, referred to the Azzam Pasha quotation, citing the October 11, 1947, article in Akhbar al-Yom.
[2] Azzam's quoted first sentence, without its initial caveat, appeared in English in a Jewish Agency memorandum to the United Nations Palestine Commission in February 1948.
[2]Until 2010, the source of the quotation has been commonly claimed to be a press conference in Cairo on May 15, 1948, one day after the Israeli declaration of independence, which some versions say was broadcast by the BBC.
He wrote that: "Azzam actually said that he feared that if the people of Palestine were to be forcibly and against all right dispossessed, a tragedy comparable to the Mongol invasions and the Crusades might not be avoidable.
[2] In response to Segev, Karsh wrote that while it is true that Azzam was prepared to allow survivors of the destroyed Jewish state to live as dhimmis, in his view "this can hardly be considered an indication of moderation".
In his opinion:The flimsy alliance that the Egyptian authorities pretended to let King Abdallah lead into battle was, at one and the same moment, an anti-Israeli and an anti-Jordanian instrument.
In political terms, however, its purpose was to prevent the partition of Palestine between Israel and Jordan by forcing Amman, first, to make war against Zionism, and, second, to refrain from cutting a deal with the enemy without the authorization of Cairo.
I warned the Jewish leaders whom I met in London about continuing their policy, and I told them that the Arab soldier is the strongest in the world.
In the end I understand the consequence of this bloody war, I see in front of me its horrible battles, I can imagine its victims but I have a clear conscience since we were called to fight as defenders and not attackers!