Bahrain administrative reforms of the 1920s

Bray's next step to appoint half members of al-Majlis al-Urfi, a council concerned with commercial disputes encountered opposition from Shaikh Isa which led to its suspension.

Until 1869, Bahrain was under threat of occupation by various external powers including the Wahhabis, Omanis, Ottomans, Egyptians and Persians, yet the Al Khalifa managed to keep it under their control.

[3] At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Britain, then the dominant power in the region was attempting to end piracy in the Persian Gulf in order to secure maritime trading routes to its East India Company in the Indies.

[54][n 12] On the other hand, pearl diving was controlled by Sunni Arab tribesmen, who had their own estates, enjoyed a high level of autonomy and freedom of operation within them, and were not directly taxed.

[96] Fearing that these incidents would allow foreign powers to "gain an opening for assailing [the British] regime", Major Percy Cox, the Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf visited Bahrain in a navy fleet on 30 November.

[126][n 27] In November 1918, Captain N. N. E. Bray was appointed as Political Agent in Bahrain and instructed to "seek the amelioration of the internal government by indirect and pacific means and by gaining the confidence and trust of the shaikh".

[136] Dickson was annoyed by Shaikh Isa's repeated talk of Wilson's Fourteen Points statement (he referred to it as "utterances") on the right of self-determination and independence of small nations.

He refused to provide protection to individuals and turned a blind eye to the tribal administration persecution and killing of Baharnah peasants whom Dickson had promised with salvation.

Mohammed Al Tajir mentioned that the British Political Agency silence was the main motivation for continuation of oppression of Baharnah and described Daly's attitude as "trickery".

[38] For tribes and pearl merchants, especially Al Dawasir, the basis of their rejection was that reforms would place them on same footing with other people with regard to taxation and law, thus removing all advantages they had enjoyed.

Back in March they had requested "taking immediate measures for introducing reforms in Bahrain's financial and banking system" whereas by now they did not want any direct interference and only offered moral support.

[199] In July, Daly wrote that Baharnah themselves were divided; those who used peaceful means to support reforms were disappointed, others were stocking weapons and calling for outright revolution if the situation worsened.

It asked the Government of India to "express their earnest hope that steps might be taken forthwith for the introduction at Bahrain of reforms tending to ensure the equitable treatment of Shi'a".

[210][n 49] The specific sequence of events is disputed,[213] but it is accepted that riots started after Abdulla al-Qusaibi (an agent of Ibn Saud and a pearl merchant) had accused a Persian shopkeeper of stealing a watch from his house.

[231][n 52] Knox then gave a speech in which he affirmed the British support for administrative reforms, announced transforming custom revenues to Shaikh Hamad and told Al Dawasir that they may migrate to Saudi Arabia as they have frequently threatened, but that they should not "be surprised if [their] lands and houses are confiscated".

[252] On 26 October, a group of 12 Sunni merchants and tribal leaders formed the "Bahrain National Congress" which called for six demands, among them were the restoration of Shaikh Isa as ruler unless he consented to the change, formation of a consultative council and that reforms should be compliant with Sharia and Urf.

He explained to Shaikh Isa that reforms were not the "personal wish of Knox or Daly", but orders of the British Government and that the "public scandal" of "tyranny and oppression" in Bahrain made them necessary.

[271] Daly, helped by his strong personal relationship with Shaikh Hamad and the pro-reform petitions continued to take a prominent part in the implementation of reforms on a daily basis, well beyond the legal frame of BOIC.

The revenue of the customs, which was redirected to a government account in a British bank increased significantly that Bahrain's financial resources were described as "pleasingly solvent" by the end of 1923.

It was based on the "Magna Carta" declaration of Shaikh Isa and introduced big improvements from previous practices in which "every member of Al-Khalifah family used to convict and punish Baharnah peasants without trial".

There were two main goals, the first was to end the decades-long practice of "squeezing the indigenous Shiah population out of their [date-groves]" and the second was to tax all lands equally in order to support state budget.

Shaikh Hamad however acted contrary to the Agent's advice; on 30 April 1928, 2 days after Ibrahim and his brother Salman had returned to Bahrain, he held a meeting that was attended by a Shia judge, the head of Sitra community (where the attacks occurred), Belgrave and children of the victims.

Belgrave was in control of all offices and British officials involvement was described in November 1927 by Denys Bray, the Secretary of the Foreign Department of the Government of India as "more than desirable".

[310] American political scientists Michael Herb had a similar analysis, describing Hamad as a "puppet" who was dependent on Britain due to lacking family support.

[168] Mai Al Khalifa, Bahrain's Minister of Culture argued that the British aim behind the reforms was to gain power and that they have deceived and used the Baharnah for this goal while privately warning Ibn Saud against their influence.

They stated that Baharnah leaders represented the pro-British party Bray had suggested and that were tools in the hands of the British who had successfully used sectarian differences to divide and rule.

[81] Nelida Fuccaro stated that the goal of reforms was "empowering large sections of the impoverished Arab Shi‘i population and at keeping the political activities of Iran among the local Persian communities in check while creating a suitable framework for the continuation of the rule of the al-Khalifah family".

[13] Al-Rumaihi described the demands of Bahrain National Congress as "extremely progressive" and argued that they would have "sown the seeds of a more constitutional form of government" if accepted back then.

He added that Baharnah did not cooperate with this movement due to the longstanding mistrust between the two communities and criticized British officers for favoring "reforms when imposed by themselves, but not when proposed by the indigenous Bahraini population".

[321] F. Gregory Gause argues that the reforms did not reduce the power base of Al Khalifa and its tribal allies, but forced them to change their methods while remaining dominant.