Battle of Albuera

From October 1810, Marshal Masséna's French Army of Portugal had been tied down in an increasingly hopeless stand-off against Wellington's Allied forces, safely entrenched in and behind the Lines of Torres Vedras.

Acting on Napoleon's orders, in early 1811 Marshal Soult led a French expedition from Andalusia into Extremadura in a bid to draw Allied forces away from the Lines and ease Masséna's plight.

Soult was able to capture the strategically important fortress at Badajoz on the border between Spain and Portugal from the Spanish, but was forced to return to Andalusia following Marshal Victor's defeat in March at the Battle of Barrosa.

In April, following news of Masséna's complete withdrawal from Portugal, Wellington sent a powerful Anglo-Portuguese corps commanded by General Sir William Beresford to retake the border town.

[16] Soult now knew a successful attack against Lisbon was beyond his means with the forces proposed—there were 30,000 Allied troops and six major fortresses between his army and the Portuguese capital—but he had received orders nonetheless and felt obliged to do something.

[15] He therefore gathered an army of 20,000 men, mainly from V Corps, and launched an expedition into Extremadura with the limited aim of capturing the fortress at Badajoz and hopefully drawing some of the Allied forces away from their impregnable positions in the lines.

[19] The garrison of Badajoz, ably commanded by General Rafael Menacho, initially put up strong resistance and by 3 March the French had made little progress against the powerful fortress.

On that day, however, Menacho was killed on the ramparts by a chance shot; command of the garrison fell to Brigadier General José Imaz and the Spanish defense started to slacken.

Soult was anxious to press the siege since he had learned that Masséna, in command of a disintegrating army plagued by sickness, starvation and an unusually harsh Portuguese winter, had retreated from Portugal.

[23] With no political considerations to get in the way, the Allies soon learnt of Soult's investment of Badajoz, and with the threat from Masséna diminished by his withdrawal towards Spain, Wellington prepared to send his 2nd and 4th divisions (now under the command of General Sir William Beresford) to relieve the siege.

Leaving six battalions to hold the fortress, in early March he moved against the nearby Portuguese town of Campo Maior with around 7,000 men and three batteries borrowed from the siege-train stationed at Badajoz.

Despite being manned by only 800 militia and Ordenanças, commanded by Major José Talaya, the town held out for seven days—surrendering only when an entire face of the bastion crumbled under the bombardment from Mortier's artillery.

On returning to Badajoz after his successful foray into Portugal, Mortier had left one infantry and three cavalry regiments at Campo Maior, under Latour-Maubourg, to dismantle its defences; Beresford's appearance on 25 March caught the French by surprise.

Furthermore, the rations promised to Beresford, to be taken from the town of Estremoz, had been consumed by the remnants of Mendizabal's Army of Extremadura, which had settled in the region following their defeat by Soult at the start of the year.

This could have proved disastrous for Beresford, but Mortier had been recalled to Paris leaving Latour-Maubourg in command at Badajoz, and he was more concerned with repairing the fortress's defences than confronting the Allied army.

[34] After a minor success involving the capture of an entire squadron of the 13th Light Dragoons, Latour-Maubourg retired before Beresford's superior forces, leaving 3,000 men garrisoning Badajoz and 400 in Olivenza.

[38] Beresford left his cavalry and a brigade under Lieutenant Colonel John Colborne, along with a detachment of Spanish horse, to watch Latour-Maubourg's movements and dissuade him from returning to Extremadura.

Beresford kept up the pretence of besieging Badajoz by sending an unsuccessful demand for surrender to the French commander on the afternoon of that same day, but he realized he would now not have time to finish the job, so he ordered the withdrawal of his siege guns and supplies.

[45] On 13 May, the Spanish cavalry attached to Colborne's brigade came into contact with the French force and, in accordance with orders given by Wellington in April, they fell back while sending word of Soult's new position to Beresford.

However, when Beresford met with Blake and Castaños, the two most senior Spanish generals, at Valverde on 14 May, he allowed himself to be persuaded that the numerical superiority the Allied army had over Soult justified risking a battle.

[58] Beresford deployed his troops on the reverse slopes of such hills as could be found on the battlefield; unable to see the Allied army, Soult was still unaware that Blake's Spanish divisions had come up during the night.

[61] Alarmed, Beresford rode forward to observe the French manoeuvres; when Godinot's cavalry support and Werlé's brigade began to move away from Albuera and toward Girard's rear, Soult's true intentions became clear.

Soult had concentrated his entire infantry strength, except for Godinot's 3,500 men who were still engaged at Albuera, and all his cavalry save Briche's light horse, into one front marching on Blake's right flank.

Mindful of the dangers presented by Latour-Maubourg's horsemen, Cole flanked his line at either end with a unit in column: on the right were the division's massed light companies, including those from Brigadier Kemmis's brigade,[56] while the first battalion of the Lusitanian Legion took station on the left.

"[104] This admonition was unnecessary though: Latour-Maubourg quickly placed his cavalry between the chasing Allied divisions and the fleeing French infantry, and aborting their pursuit the British and Portuguese instead drew up on the heights they had just won.

[108] It was not apparent to Beresford that there was little chance of Soult resuming hostilities, even when Kemmis's 1,400 strong brigade (previously stranded on the north bank of the Guadiana) joined the Allied army on the battlefield at dawn.

Beresford also had the relatively unscathed Portuguese division, Alten's KGL and several Spanish battalions ready for duty; Soult, in contrast, only had Godinot's brigade and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry in a fit state to fight.

[109] News that Wellington was marching to Elvas with a further two divisions hastened the Marshal's decision to retreat, as well as persuading Beresford not to launch a premature offensive against Soult's superior artillery and cavalry.

[108] Soult marched away before dawn on 18 May, leaving several hundred wounded behind for the Allies to treat,[110] and Beresford, despite a large advantage in numbers and a day's rest, was nevertheless unable to pursue.

"[117] Likewise, the British House of Commons passed a motion expressing gratitude for the steadfastness of the Spanish troops—a distinction rarely conferred on Britain's allies during the Napoleonic Wars.

Map of Badajoz (1873)
Map of the battle, from Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula
The Buffs (3rd Regiment) defend their colours, painted by William Barnes Wollen . The engagement saw the 3rd (East Kent) Regiment of Foot (The Buffs) deployed with Lieutenant-Colonel John Colborne 's 1st Brigade. They sustained heavy casualties after being surrounded by Polish lancers and French hussars.
Map of the battle, from Alison's History of Europe