The battle was fought in the town of Bautzen (Upper Sorbian: Budyšin) (Polish: Budziszyn) and the rural areas to the northeast situated primarily along the Bautzen–Niesky line.

The Polish Second Army under Karol Świerczewski suffered heavy losses, but, with the aid of Soviet reinforcements, prevented the German forces from breaking through to their rear.

[2] By the end of the month, the Polish Second Army and the Soviet forces had repelled the German attack, forming a line toward Kamenz–Doberschütz–Dauban, and was preparing to launch an offensive toward Prague.

[3] As noted by historians such as Wawer and Komorowski, despite the heavy casualties, the Polish–Soviet frontline was not seriously breached, and thus the German offensive was a failure.

[1][2] In the last months of World War II, the Polish Second Army, under General Karol Świerczewski, took part in the Soviet drive on Berlin.

[6][7] On 18 and 19 April elements of the Second Army (the 8th Infantry Division and 1st Armored Corps) engaged the Germans in the south and pushed them back while the remaining units (5th, 7th, 9th and 10th infantry divisions) drove on to Dresden, gaining bridgeheads on the River Spree north of Bautzen and destroying German forces in the Muskauer Forst.

[7] The following day Soviet units of the 7th Mechanized Corps captured parts of Bautzen and secured the line south of Niesky, taking Weißenberg and trapping several German formations.

[8][9] Świerczewski decided to prioritize the taking of Dresden over securing his southern flank, deviating from the plan he was given by Konev.

[7][10][2] The Germans were pinning their hopes on the idea that the Soviets might be fended off long enough for the city to be surrendered to the Western Allies.

[1] German forces were composed of elements of the 4th Panzer Army and commanded by the headquarters for the Grossdeutschland and 57th Armored Corps.

[12][b] The Polish Second Army consisted of five infantry divisions: (5th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th, the 1st Armoured Corps, and smaller units), about 84,000–90,000 men, and 500 tanks.

[14] The command group managed to break through to the 16th Tank Brigade, but that unit itself was almost annihilated at Förstgen (Forsiegen); out of 1,300 soldiers, only about 100 survived.

[15][19][20] By 23 April the German breakthrough reached the Schwarzer Schöps River in the east, and Lohsa, Oppitz and Grossdubrau in the west.

[2] Eventually, Świerczewski halted his force's advance on Dresden, and ordered it to pull back and secure the breach.

At the same time at Bautzen the 20th Panzer Division was able to make contact with the trapped units in the town from the south.

A hastily assembled Polish counterattack was not successful and most of Bautzen was then recaptured by German forces after several days of bloody house-to-house combat.

[26] Attempting to withdraw quickly and to rejoin the main forces, it was intercepted by the Germans and sustained heavy losses.

[1] The units were moving with insufficient security, on the assumption that the line of retreat was safe; at the same time the Germans captured Polish orders with details of their planned withdrawal routes.

[2] 26th Infantry Regiment from the 9th Division took very heavy casualties (75 percent) in the "valley of death" around Panschwitz-Kuckau and Crostwitz.

[2] By the end of the month, the Polish Second Army and the Soviet forces had repelled the German attack, forming a line toward Kamenz–Doberschütz–Dauban, and was preparing to launch an offensive toward Prague.

[1] The German forces failed in their objective of breaking through the 1st Ukrainian Front and coming to the aid of Berlin.

[1] The actions of other Polish officers have also been questioned, such as the 9th Infantry Division commander's decision to advance without sufficient reconnaissance and escort.

[1] As noted by historians such as Wawer and Komorowski, despite the heavy casualties, the Polish–Soviet frontline was not seriously breached, and thus the German offensive was a failure.