[1] Commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, Army Group Centre was tasked with attacking from Poland through the Białystok – Minsk – Smolensk axis towards Moscow.

The 13th Army was held as part of the Stavka High Command Reserve and initially existed as a headquarters unit only, with no assigned forces.

The plan suffered from weakness along the flanks, created by circumstances such as the line of demarcation placement following the division of Poland in 1939.

The forward placement of both German and Soviet forces in a double-bulge position enabled both sides to try the double envelopment.

Beyond Białystok, Minsk was a key strategic railway junction and a defensive position of the main road and rail communications with Moscow.

In the north, 3rd Panzer Group attacked, cutting off the 11th Army from Western Front, and crossed the Neman River.

The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Bug River and by 23 June, it had penetrated 60 km into Soviet territory.

The Panzer Groups' objectives were to meet east of Minsk and prevent any Red Army withdrawal from the encirclement.

On 23 June, the Soviet 10th Army attempted a counter-attack in accordance with pre-war planning, but failed to achieve its goals.

[15] The Soviet troops trapped in the gigantic pockets continued fighting, and concluding operations resulted in high German casualties.

An exception was Pavlov's operations officer, General Ivan Boldin, who had been cut off by the German advance at a forward headquarters in the first days of the invasion but then fought his way back to Soviet lines with over 1,000 other soldiers a month and a half later.

[4] The Panzer Group had only 6,320 replacements to cover the losses, but that deficit imposed only a minimal burden on its combat capabilities.