[4] The battle saw a new German Panzer brigade hastily set up by the Wehrmacht to stop the Allied advance after the collapse of the Normandy front, and a unit of the French 2nd Armoured Division under General Philippe Leclerc.

The inexperienced 112 Panzer Brigade suffered from a series of ambushes by French armoured units with American air support.

The unexpected Franco-American advance towards the Moselle put the German High Command in difficulty; Hitler and OB West were trying to assemble a substantial mechanized force to mount a counterattack in the Lorraine area.

[8] On 8 September 1944, the 106th Panzer-brigade attempted a counter attack between Mairy and Briey to try and block General Walton Walker's US XX Corps advance towards the Moselle, but were repelled with heavy losses.

[9] 'Groupement Langlade' probed forward towards Vittel splitting the German defences, and seized the town on 11 September capturing many prisoners.

Around the same time, the Germans under Generals Johannes Blaskowitz and Hasso von Manteuffel had moved their armoured forces to try to block the allied advance.

[15] The other group of the 2nd Armoured were to the north and south, where the reconnaissance unit of Lieutenant Colonel Nicolas Roumiantsoff were covering the right flank.

[19] In the dark on the southwestern outskirts, a French reconnaissance group from the Fourth Tank Squadron led by Lieutenant Jean Bailaud first came into contact with the Germans.

[20] Both sides traded shots as darkness fell, while French artillery fired on all entrances to the village to block all possible movement.

A contingent of the Régiment Blindé de Fusiliers-Marins, manned by French navy personnel led by Lieutenant Durville in three tank destroyers named Siroco, Mistral and Simoun, advanced towards the village but found no resistance.

[22] In the exchange of fire, two Panzers were hit and knocked out forcing the Germans to retreat, while the French had lost two jeeps and a half-track.

[18] Langlade reacted quickly and organized an improvised artillery barrage along the main road assisted by a small number of M4 Shermans of the 12e Régiment Chasseurs d'Afrique, M10 tank destroyers and anti-tank guns.

[28] Langlade decided to evacuate his command post first to Gelvecourt before rejoining with the bulk of 'Groupe Minjonnet' who were deployed near Dompaire.

The German Panzers with small groups of tanks to the south and east made a series of weak attacks to try to break through the circle established by the French on the high ground.

These attempts turned out to be costly – the German tanks were surprised and hit on the flanks at close range by the French armoured vehicles of 'Groupe Massu' and 'Groupe Minjonnet'.

Massu then entered Dompaire, which had been heavily damaged in the fighting; and the French found the remains of thirty-three German tanks destroyed, thirteen of which were hit by armoured vehicles.

On 14 September, Colonel Hans von Luck attempted to advance westward from Hennecourt with a kampfgruppe made up of tanks and panzer-grenadiers from the 21st Panzer Division.

[31] After these failures, the German command decided to give up further attacks – the kampfgruppe fell back together with the survivors of the 112th Panzer brigade, retreating towards Epinal.

The French inspected the tanks and discovered that they were of very recent production; having emerged from the MAN factory in Nuremberg at the end of July, and delivered on 15 August.

One Panther 'AusF 332' which was captured intact in the main street of Dompaire was put on display outside Hôtel National des Invalides in Paris.

[2] German High Command admitted the loss of 34 Panthers and 26 Panzer IVs and upwards of 350 dead, 1,000 wounded and several guns.

It had practically destroyed a German armoured brigade equipped with latest model Panzers, and demonstrated the tactical ability of its commanders and the experience and combativeness of its men.

The contribution of the air support provided by the US fighter-bombers was also important, having destroyed or forced the abandonment of a significant number of German tracked vehicles for the loss of only one P-47.

[12] From an operational point of view, the German defeat and subsequent retreat also had important strategic consequences: Haislip's XV Army Corps was able to reach the Moselle river by 17 September.

Two days later Haislip and his forces crossed the Moselle and advanced south of Lunéville, aligning with the other two US corps of Patton's 3rd Army which were already east of the river.

Despite the defeat at Dompaire, Hitler did not modify his plans and ordered Blaskowitz and von Manteuffel to counter-attack Patton's army north of Lunéville.