The battle had limited strategic effect, but, while showing the skill of the Dutch troops, it highlighted the disunity in the Anglo-Dutch command structure.

The War of the Spanish Succession had commenced in the Netherlands in 1702 with the siege and capture of Kaiserswerth, and with the unsuccessful assault of the French army on Nijmegen.

Marlborough took command of the combined Anglo-Dutch army on 1 July and at the head of 60,000 men went on the offensive by moving into the Spanish Netherlands.

They had no other intention than to protect the regions of Brabant by means of an extensive entrenched line, which, passed over to the right bank of the Scheldt at Antwerp, and extended over Herentals, Aarschot, Diest and the Mehaigne near Huy to the Meuse.

The greater part of May and June continued with inconclusive movements on both side, after which Marlborough decided to attack and break through the entrenched lines behind which the French army had withdrawn.

[15][16] Questions can be raised about this plan of attack as the two divisions under the Dutch generals were isolated from each other by the Scheldt and would not be able to come to each other's aid quickly in case of emergency.

Obdam believed he should not act against the orders received and not abandon the position at Ekeren, but he reminded Marlborough of the precarious state of his division.

However, although Coehoorn and Sparre did attack and capture the Spanish lines at Stekene near Hulst on 27 June,[17] the main army under Marlborough and Ouwerkerk started its diversion too early.

They warned Obdam on 29 June that Villeroy had taken advantage of this to send Duke of Boufflers with part of the French army to link up with the Spanish near Antwerp, under the Marquis of Bedmar.

Obdam moved the baggage to safety in time, but, as the French march was expected to take longer than it did, the positions which his army occupied were not yet abandoned when Boufflers arrived.

[19] Early in the morning of 30 June the French dragoons of Louis de Guiscard marched from Merksem and Ekeren in the direction of Kapellen to cut off any potential escape route for the Dutch to Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom, while Bedmar and his Spanish troops were positioned near Wilmarsdonk.

[23] The engagement was long and bloody, but the Dutch lower commanders made up for the disparity in numbers by leaning on discipline, drill, and independent and quick thinking.

They pulled back which gave the French and Spanish the opportunity to throw more troops into the battle for Oorderen and the Dutch were finally driven out of the village.

[27] Around this time, some Dutch troops ran out of ammunition and Fagel ordered the soldiers to use the tin buttons of their uniform coats as bullets.

[25][31] The main Dutch force, clustered in a thick mass and followed by the cavalry, advanced over the Scheldt embankment from Wilmerdonk, and stormed Oorderen from that side.

[31] The Duke of Berwick, one of the French generals, wrote: ... most of our men, believing they had lost the battle, withdrew to the heathland during the darkness, close to the cavalry which had remained there.

The Dutch pulled back several kilometres, occupying a tactically more favourable position, and Boufflers' detachment returned, as if nothing had happened, to the French main army.

[38] He argued that the limited success of the French forces in this otherwise well-designed and initially promising undertaking was caused by the quality of Bedmar's infantry regiments.

[10] However, Louis XIV was so displeased with Boufflers that he not only withheld the supreme command from him later, but also did not allow him to lead a force in the open field anymore, except for the year of 1709.

He was criticised because of the incident,[41] and although Huy, Limbourg and Geldern fell into Allied hands in the months following Ekeren, Marlborough failed to bring Villeroy to battle.

[48] He feared that the lack of decisive success in the Low Countries would deter the Dutch from sending troops to Germany, where the Holy Roman Emperor was in an increasingly dire military situation.