32°30′20.002″N 45°49′0.001″E / 32.50555611°N 45.81666694°E / 32.50555611; 45.81666694 British Empire The Battle of Es Sinn was a World War I military engagement between Anglo-Indian and Ottoman forces.

Following a night march, the British and Indian troops defeated the Ottoman forces, driving them from their defensive positions along the Tigris.

While originally only envisioned as a limited campaign to secure the oil pipeline at Abadan, the success of the British and Indian troops in late 1914 and early 1915 caused the planners in Simla and in the field to re-evaluate the mission.

They saw a chance to demonstrate that British Empire was still pre-eminent in the region, despite the stalemate on the Western Front and deteriorating situation in Gallipoli.

[1] The best way to ensure Indian security, as well as those of the Abadan oil supply was to advance at least as far as the Shatt al Hai, the canal connecting the Tigris and Euphrates River, and ideally by capturing Baghdad.

However, Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, warned Simla that while its actions were approved, they would have to achieve victory with forces already in theater.

In addition to the area around Basra, Force D now also laid claim as far north along the Tigris as Ali Gharbi, and to Nasiryeh along the Euphrates.

Not only had Nixon not accepted additional logistical support, he had failed to ask for the return of animals that his predecessor had sent back to India, which were required to haul Townshend's supplies.

Furthermore, with the campaign at Gallipoli nearing its climax, Ottoman resources were focused there as well as fending off Imperial Russia's offensive in the Caucasus Mountains.

A veteran of the Balkan Wars, Nureddin was charged by Enver Pasha with defending every inch of the Baghdad vilayet with an eye towards to recapturing Basra.

Nureddin chose to set his defenses at the Es Sinn, a bend along the Tigris south of Kut al Amarra.

Their size, even in the dry months of late summer and early autumn were thought to make them effective barriers to any large scale enveloping maneuver.

[10] Although the southern trench lines were not anchored by impassable obstacles, the position was on some of the only elevated ground around, giving it an excellent field of fire.

Scouts had discovered that the area between the Ataba and Suwaikiya Marshes, north of the Ottoman lines, was passable for a heavy formation.

Column A, composed of the 2nd Dorsets, 117th Mahrattas, and a company of sappers, under the command of Brigadier General Delamain, was given the job of clearing the Ottoman positions between the Suwada and Ataba marshes.

Column B, comprising the 17th (Ahmednagar) Brigade with the 20th Punjabis and 104th Wellesley's Rifles, under the command of Brigadier-General F. A. Hoghton, were assigned to strike at the rear trench line of the Ottoman positions.

The third element, the 18th (Belgaum) Brigade under Brigadier General Fry, would make a demonstration along the Ottoman front, fixing the defenders in position.

Attacking the northern end of the Ottoman defenses, the 117th Maharattas and 22 Company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners, suffering heavy casualties.

Unknown to Delamain, Houghton's column had already been engaged, stumbling into a previously undiscovered Ottoman redoubt near the marsh.

Although still engaged in clearing out the Ottoman northern positions, he shifted his forces south, trying to bring them to support Fry's brigade.

[15] But while dealing with the reserves, Delamain could not spare troops to help Fry's attack, which remained bogged down in front of the Ottoman trenches.

Ordering them forward, Townshend hoped that they would be able to capture the Ottoman river boats anchored in Kut, as well as the town, unsupported.

By the end of the day, the British and Indian troops had captured most of the northern trench network on the left bank of the Tigris.

With his reserves driven back, Nureddin realized that continuing to try to hold the position at the Es Sinn would result in the destruction of the 38th Division.

The former was the more difficult problem because the 6th Cavalry Brigades regiments were made up primarily of Sikh and Hindus, both of whom would refuse to eat their food if it was cooked using local requisitioned or captured pots as their dietary laws conflicted with the native Muslim population.

[19] Townshend's forces held the battle field as Nureddin's Sixth Army[citation needed] retreated north of Kut.

[27] For the remainder of the year, and into 1916, the river would drop, except during the spring thaws, to levels making it more difficult for many of the ships to navigate the Tigris.

Despite the fact that his two divisions were stretched logistically, medically, and operationally by the advance to Kut, Nixon and his staff believed that the Ottoman forces in the region were on the verge of collapse.

The expedition's political officer, Sir Percy Cox was of the opinion that capturing Baghdad would boost the British Empire's flagging reputation in the region.

In the India Office's opinion, even if Baghdad could be captured, it was unlikely that forces in the region and those that could be transferred there in the near future could withstand an Ottoman counter-offensive.