The Australians were unable to concentrate sufficient combat power to launch an assault on the position and consequently they were forced to withdraw after a fierce engagement during which both sides suffered casualties, reluctantly leaving behind two men who had been shot and could not be recovered due to heavy machine-gun and rifle fire.

[1] However, with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) weakened by successive defeats at the hands of the communists, the South Vietnamese government faltering, and Saigon threatened with a major offensive, the situation led to a significant escalation of the war in 1965, with a large-scale commitment of US ground troops under the command of General William Westmoreland.

[6] With the situation reaching a crisis point during the Viet Cong wet season offensive in June 1965, Westmoreland requested further reinforcement and US and allied forces increased to 44 battalions which would be used to directly bolster the ARVN.

[14] By late 1965 the junction of the Bé and Đồng Nai rivers had become a major communist staging area for men, equipment, and supplies for units based around Saigon and the Mekong Delta.

[19][18] U1 was responsible for co-ordinating the Viet Cong regional defence against the Bien Hoa air base and for developing anti-government resistance and had been tasked with rebuilding the covert organisation in Biên Hòa city and the surrounding villages up to the Đồng Nai, as well as re-establishing the link between Biên Hòa city and War Zone D, and for planning and executing attacks against the air base itself.

Despite a lengthy preparation by fire, a large Viet Cong force had been observed in the vicinity of LZ Queen prior to the insertion of the lead Australian rifle company—D Company under the command of Captain Peter Rothwell.

By mid-morning 1 RAR occupied LZ Queen, with the 105 mm L5 pack howitzers of 105 Field Battery also flying in to provide direct support.

[23] The scheme of manoeuvre adopted by 1 RAR dictated that each company undertake a dispersed patrol program in their own tactical area of responsibility, a fact which would allow them to search more ground, but limit their ability to concentrate combat power in the event of contact.

Intelligence gained from these incidents indicated the presence of a Viet Cong Main Force Regiment in the area, while documents recovered contained plans for attacks on ARVN outposts near Bien Hoa Air Base.

[23][25] Meanwhile, although unknown to them at the time, the US 1/503rd Battalion across the Đồng Nai River had patrolled to within 2,000 metres (2,200 yd) of a major Viet Cong bunker system sited on two spur lines in the vicinity of Hill 65.

By 10:30 the Australians moved out in single file but had not gone far before a lone Viet Cong scout was observed shadowing them; he was subsequently shot and killed by the rear section.

[26] Crossing a creek line the Australians uncovered a company-sized camp of dugouts and trenches, before being fired upon at 15:40 by a single Viet Cong soldier who then fled.

Suddenly, 1 Platoon was hit by heavy small arms fire from at least three Viet Cong machine-guns in well-sited bunkers, supported by rifles and grenades.

Just 15 metres (16 yd) from the bunkers Private Peter Gillson, the machine-gunner in the forward section, was shot as he tried to move around the twisted roots of a tall tree.

Williams radioed Healy of the increasing danger while his platoon sergeant—Sergeant Colin Fawcett—had crawled forward under heavy fire to Gillson, whose body was wedged in the buttress of a large tree.

The Australians had unavoidably been placed in the worst possible position to their supporting artillery, with 105 Battery firing on a line directly towards them from their gun-line 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) on the other side of the Gang Toi plateau.

A slight miscalculation could have sent a round over the hill into the Australian positions, regardless, and despite persistent rifle and machine-gun fire, Murphy calmly directed the artillery throughout the battle.

Lieutenant Ian Guild's 2 Platoon was subsequently moved into position to cover the withdrawal, and carrying their wounded the Australians successfully broke contact without suffering further losses.

As a result, the Australians had to look after their casualties until the following morning, and they proceeded further north to a night harbour as the area was pounded by artillery, aerial bombing and helicopter gunships.

[31] Throughout the day Viet Cong reconnaissance parties, perhaps including those that had been contacted intermittently, had observed the approaching Australian force on a line leading directly to the U1 headquarters.

[18] Meanwhile, across the river in the American AO the 1/503rd had uncovered a large Viet Cong bunker system and became involved in fierce fighting that had included desperate hand-to-hand combat, with both sides resorting to using bayonets.

[27] The American paratroopers had engaged a well-equipped Viet Cong Main Force regiment, complete with khaki uniforms, steel helmets and Soviet automatic weaponry and small arms.

[33] Brumfield demanded the right to return to Hill 82 in order to destroy the bunker system and to recover the bodies of Parker and Gillson, and he and Major John Essex-Clark—the operations officer—began planning a battalion attack.

[35] A battalion attack was subsequently planned for 14 November, but Williamson later deferred it dependent on the availability of air and helicopter support, and the start date of the upcoming Operation New Life.

They had been hastily buried together in a weapon pit the day after the battle by Viet Cong soldiers, and with the assistance of the Australian and Vietnamese governments they were subsequently returned to Australia for burial.

[36] Indeed, their losses had been significant, and although claimed as a victory, the Americans had failed to secure the area even if the Viet Cong had temporarily surrendered control of the battlefield.

Indeed, from the initial landing zone being occupied by the Viet Cong, failures in the passage of information, the heavy losses suffered by the 1/503rd and the subsequent difficulties with casualty evacuation, the operation had not run smoothly.

[36] The Australians were vengeful for their losses and wanted to return to collect their dead; however, with 1 RAR absorbed into other operations the planned battalion attack on Hill 82 never occurred.