The attack would last from December 1994 to March 1995, which resulted in the military occupation of the city by the Russian Army and rallied most of the Chechen nation around the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev.

The battle caused enormous destruction and casualties amongst the civilian population and saw the heaviest bombing campaign in Europe since the end of World War II.

[10] Chechen units were organized into combat groups, typically composed of around twenty personnel, further divided into three- or four-person fire teams.

To effectively engage Russian armored vehicles in Grozny, multiple hunter-killer fire teams coordinated their actions on the ground level, as well as in second and third-story positions and basements.

Furthermore, the machine guns mounted on the armored vehicles proved inadequate in suppressing the simultaneous firepower unleashed by multiple fire teams.

To gain an advantage, the Russians strategically positioned themselves at ambush points and lured the Chechen fighters into carefully orchestrated traps by moving their armored vehicles towards them.

In a similar fashion to Soviet tank crews during the Battle in Berlin in 1945, some of the Russian armored vehicles were equipped with 'field-expedient' cages made of wire mesh.

These improvised structures were mounted approximately 30 centimeters away from the hull armor, aiming to counteract the shaped charges employed by the Chechen RPGs, and provide an additional layer of protection.

Early in December, the Russian Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev boasted he could seize Grozny in two hours with just one airborne regiment.

Advancing troops were supported only by Mi-24 attack helicopters, with the Group East losing five vehicles alone due to a friendly-fire incident by Russian air.

The Plan: Four Russian armored columns were ordered to move in a sudden and co-ordinated attack, and, after defeating all defenders, were to meet at the Presidential Palace in the center of the city.

However, the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) was late arriving to the group West, commanded by Major General Ivan Babichev, and the bloated column could barely move, with disputed reports of friendly artillery fire.

In the east, units of Major General Vadim Orlov's 104th Airborne Division did not join the 129th MRR from the Leningrad Military District after they moved on Grozny and were subsequently hit by friendly artillery fire, the 129th Regiment was badly demoralised and retreated the next day without accomplishing much.

This lack of experience, including by the individual vehicle drivers, caused a considerable traffic jam at the Mayakovskogo and Khmelnitzkogo intersection for much of an hour.

Captain Arkhangelov, 81st Regiment's deputy for training with the 1st Company, 1st Motor Rifle Battalion, reported call-sign "Mramor" ordering them to advance into the city.

In retrospect, some field troopers thought this call sign belonged to General Leonti Shevtsov, Chief of Staff of the Combined Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic.

As the Russian point vehicles reached the Presidential Palace, they were ambushed by heavy fire from Chechen small arms and rockets from roofs and basements along the street.

The Chechen ambush funneled the Russian armored columns, then the RPG gunners disabled the first and last vehicles in the line to trap the rest of the battalions in the middle.

Relatively useless in urban combat compared to dismounted fighters, Russian tanks were unable to elevate their cannons high enough to engage the top floors of many buildings, or low enough to fire into the basements.

Both battalions were ordered to stay away from the Presidential Palace; this added to the trouble as the armored columns turned into alleyways, only to be destroyed by more of the layered ambushes.

[25] Russian General Aleksandr Galkin reported 225 armored vehicles as unrepairable battle losses during the first month and a half of the invasion, including 62 tanks.

Unknown to the Russians and prior to the New Year invasion, Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev moved his headquarters to Shali, 25 kilometers south of Grozny.

Two hours after the ceasefire started, on 10 January, the Russians launched a heavy bombardment of the Presidential Palace and managed to position three tanks around the building, firing at point-blank range.

On 18 January, Russian forces launched a massive air and artillery attack; by Chechen estimation, rockets were hitting the palace at a rate of one per second.

These groups retreated to a hospital on the south side of the Sunzha river, while Russian helicopters flew over the city calling on Chechens to surrender with no effect.

General Lev Rokhlin, the commander of the unit that seized the palace was offered to be decorated with the order of the Hero of the Russian Federation, but he refused saying he saw nothing glorious in "fighting a war on my own land.

"[29] After losing so many men when taking the northern part of Grozny, the Russians concentrated their artillery heavily on the southern half, firing over 30,000 shells each day.

After blowing up most of the bridges the Chechens used the Sunzha river as a newly established front line as all but the southern part of Grozny was now in the Russian control.

[32][33] According to the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University, sources estimate that a large percentage of civilian fatalities [during the First Chechen War] occurred during the invasion of Grozny between December 1994 and March 1995.

[36] International monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe described the scenes as "unimaginable catastrophe," while German Chancellor Helmut Kohl described the events as "sheer madness.