For centuries, it has been re-interpreted in that part of Europe as an inspiration of romanticism (to advance legends or mythology) and national pride, becoming a larger symbol of struggle against foreign invaders.

[12] Traditionally, the battle's location was thought to be in the territory of the monastic state of the Teutonic Order, on the plains between three villages: Grünfelde (Grunwald) to the west, Tannenberg (Stębark) to the northeast and Ludwigsdorf (Łodwigowo, Ludwikowice) to the south.

[14] Władysław II Jagiełło referred to the site in Latin as in loco conflictus nostri, quem cum Cruciferis de Prusia habuimus, dicto Grunenvelt.

The most important and trustworthy source is Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum Cruciferis anno Christi 1410, which was written within a year of the battle by an eyewitness.

With support from the pope and Holy Roman Emperor, the Teutons conquered and converted the Prussians by the 1280s and shifted their attention to the pagan Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

[24] Its grand master, Conrad Zöllner von Rothenstein, supported by Hungarian King Sigismund of Luxemburg, responded by publicly contesting the sincerity of Jogaila's conversion, bringing the charge to a papal court.

[25] The conflict was also motivated by trade considerations: the order controlled the lower reaches of the three largest rivers (the Neman, Vistula and Daugava) in Poland and Lithuania.

[28] The order burned the castle at Dobrin (Dobrzyń nad Wisłą), captured Bobrowniki after a 14-day siege, conquered Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) and sacked several towns.

[34] By December 1409, Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas had agreed on a common strategy: their armies would unite into a single massive force and march together towards Marienburg (Malbork), capital of the Teutonic Order.

[1] To counter this perceived threat, Ulrich von Jungingen concentrated his forces in Schwetz (Świecie), a central location from where troops could respond to an invasion from any direction rather quickly.

Among them were three banners from Smolensk led by Władysław II Jagiełło's brother Lengvenis, the Tatar contingent of the Golden Horde under the command of the future Khan Jalal al-Din,[4] and Armenian cavalry troops from Podolia.

The first stage of the Grunwald campaign was the gathering of all Polish–Lithuanian troops at Czerwińsk, a designated meeting point about 80 km (50 mi) from the Prussian border, where the joint army crossed the Vistula over a pontoon bridge.

[59] Later, in the self-serving testimonies of the survivors before the Pope, the order claimed that Von Jungingen was so enraged by the alleged atrocities that he swore to defeat the invaders in battle.

[60] In the early morning of 15 July, both armies met in an area covering approximately 4 km2 (1.5 sq mi) between the villages of Grunwald, Tannenberg (Stębark) and Ludwigsdorf (Łodwigowo).

According to Długosz, the Order assumed that victory was theirs, broke their formation for a disorganized pursuit of the retreating Lithuanians, and gathered much loot before returning to the battlefield to face the Polish troops.

Commanded by Grand Komtur Kuno von Lichtenstein [de; pl; ru], the Teutonic forces concentrated on the Polish right flank.

[39] Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen then personally led 16 banners, almost a third of the original Teutonic strength, to the right Polish flank,[74] and Władysław II Jagiełło deployed his last reserves, the third line of his army.

[39] The melee reached the Polish command and one knight, identified as Lupold or Diepold of Kökeritz, charged directly against King Władysław II Jagiełło.

[39] The Teutonic Order attributed the defeat to treason on the part of Nicholas von Renys (Mikołaj of Ryńsk), commander of the Culm (Chełmno) banner, and he was beheaded without a trial.

[78] A note sent in August by envoys of King Sigismund of Hungary, Nicholas II Garai and Stibor of Stiboricz, put total casualties at 8,000 dead "on both sides".

[80] A letter by a Teutonic official from Tapiau (Gvardeysk) mentioned that only half of the Lithuanians returned, but it is unclear how many of those casualties are attributable to the battle and how many to the later siege of Marienburg.

Considerable ransoms were recorded; for example, the mercenary Holbracht von Loym had to pay 150 kopas of Prague groschen, amounting to more than 30 kg (66 lb) of silver.

Władysław II Jagiełło also sent his troops to other Teutonic fortresses, which often surrendered without resistance,[89] including the major cities of Danzig (Gdańsk), Thorn (Toruń), and Elbing (Elbląg).

[91] The besiegers of Marienburg expected a speedy capitulation and were not prepared for a long siege, suffering from lack of ammunition, low morale, and an epidemic of dysentery.

Władysław II Jagiełło wanted to build a monastery dedicated to Saint Bridget of Sweden, who had prophesied the downfall of the Teutonic Order, at the location of the battle.

[100] When the order regained the territory of the battlefield, the new grand master Heinrich von Plauen built a chapel dedicated to Saint Mary and it was consecrated in March 1413.

In 1901, a large memorial stone was erected for the fallen Grand Master in the midst of the chapel ruins for the 200th anniversary of the coronation of King Frederick I of Prussia.

[114] Between 2014 and 2019, archaeologists from Scandinavia and Poland investigated an area of approximately 450 hectares (1,100 acres) with metal detectors and located the main battle site according to Ekdahl's predictions.

[12] For example, SS Chief Heinrich Himmler told Nazi Germany's leader Adolf Hitler on the first day of the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944: "After five, six weeks we shall leave.

But by then Warsaw, the capital, the head, the intelligence of this former 16–17 million Polish people will be extinguished, this Volk that has blocked our way to the east for 700 years and has stood in our way ever since the First Battle of Tannenberg.