The army was moved from its winter camp near Radoszkowice in June 1708; the movement was plagued by poor road conditions and weather.

To the south, General Anikita Repnin deployed his force and fortified his position three kilometers to the southeast, but many fortifications were not completed due to a lack of engineers.

[5] To the south, General Anikita Repnin, for whom it was the first battle in which he commanded his troops all by himself, deployed his force and hastily fortified his position three kilometers to the southeast.

Most of his fortifications were only partially completed, whereas his forces were stretched and vulnerable for a concentrated attack, forming a long and thin line.

[5] Knowing the weakness of their defence, lacking overall command unity and a clear idea of the enemy's location, they lost confidence in themselves shortly before the battle.

Crossing the marshy area between the two Russian camps would not only be an unsuspected move, but would also serve to divide the enemy force in two.

Infantry carried fascines to help them traverse the waterlogged ground before crossing the Vabich on leather pontoon bridges.

General Repnin soon saw the danger of a Swedish wedge forming between the two Russian positions, and ordered his men to decamp and head north toward Sheremetev.

However, when news of the Repnin's setback reached Sheremetev, he decided not to wait for a Swedish attack on his rear, but instead began retreating towards Shklov by the Dnieper.

[10] The victory provided the Swedes with a defensive line along the Dnieper and the area around Mogilev could be used as a base of operations in their campaign against Russia.