In late September 1939, Major Henryk Dobrzański, of the 110th Reserve Uhlan Regiment, gathered a group of officers and soldiers around him, all determined to continue fighting the Germans.

[1] Initially, Dobrzański planned to come to the aid of the besieged Warsaw, but upon receiving news of its surrender, he decided to try to break through to Hungary and from there reach the Polish Army being reformed in France.

[2] In the early days of October 1939, the group made its way to the Świętokrzyskie Mountains, where the enthusiastic reception from the local population convinced Dobrzański that the September defeat had not broken the resolve of the Polish society.

Major Dobrzański aimed to wait for the expected Franco-British offensive in the spring of 1940 and to support the Allies with intense military actions behind German lines.

[7] Hubal gained great popularity and authority among the local population,[8] and his actions contributed to overcoming the apathy and discouragement prevalent in Polish society at the time.

On the orders of the commander of the Łódź District of the Union of Armed Struggle, Colonel Leopold Okulicki, codenamed Miller, a significant number of officers and soldiers left the unit on 13 March.

In March 1940, the Germans began preparations to deal with Hubal, but disputes over jurisdiction between the Wehrmacht and the police authorities of the General Government delayed the start of the operation.

[15] Due to the fact that the police authorities did not want to share their expected success with anyone,[16] the plan and the timing of the operation were kept secret from the local Wehrmacht commanders.

[14] The German intelligence did not have precise information on the whereabouts of Hubal's unit, so the occupiers decided to attack both villages they knew to be its headquarters – Gałki and Hucisko.

[a] Bączewski engaged in an unequal battle with the entire German company, intending to delay the enemy's march and give Hubal additional time to prepare for defence.

[18] Initially, the reports about the German movements did not cause concerns for Major Hubal, who predicted that the enemy would not launch a full-scale attack before dawn.

[b][19] In the early morning, Hubal ordered combat readiness, but the defensive positions were only occupied after patrols confirmed that the Germans had taken Skłoby and that there was no threat to the Polish rear from the road between Końskie and Przysucha.

[21] The defence plan anticipated that the main German assault would fall on two 30-man infantry platoons, stationed at the edge of the forest about two kilometres from Hucisko.

In reserve, Hubal left a cavalry platoon under the command of Sergeant Major Józef Alicki [pl] and a team of heavy machine guns.

The gunfire caused confusion and heavy losses in the German ranks, but the policemen quickly recovered from the surprise and responded with dense, though inaccurate, fire.

[23] The major also sent a three-man mounted patrol to the left wing's edge, led by Corporal Brzozowski, ordering them to bypass the Germans from the northeast and then fire on their flank.

Encouraged by the success, Brzozowski continued his raid into the German rear but fell into an ambush and was killed, with two of his subordinates wounded (both managed to return to the main forces of the unit).

[25] Upon hearing this, Hubal ordered Sergeant Major Alicki to bypass the German positions under the cover of the forest and then destroy the unprotected vehicles.

On the night of 1 to 2 April, a cavalry detachment, with Hubal at its head, broke through the positions of the 8th SS-Totenkopfverbände Regiment, stationed along the road between Odrowąż and Samsonów.

The cavalry then hid for the entire day in a dense thicket, and after nightfall, they moved toward Podchyby, where they silently crossed the outer ring of the German blockade.