[1]: 375 On the 21st, the Eighth Army G-2 (intelligence officer) reported that his information still was not firm enough to "indicate the nearness" of the impending enemy offensive with any degree of certainty.

On the east flank of the advance, the Hwacheon Dam, defended so stoutly by PVA 39th Army forces only a few days earlier, fell to the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment (1st KMC) without a fight.

[1]: 376 The first blows of the Chinese Spring Offensive on US IX Corps’ front were directed at the ROK 6th Division which simply evaporated as its frightened soldiers fled the field of battle.

West's battalion was soon on trucks headed for its new position, but the convoy could only creep along over roads choked with panic-stricken ROK soldiers escaping the battle zone.

Private First Class Herbert A. Littleton, a radioman with the forward observer team attached to Company C, was standing the mid-watch when the PVA appeared.

Forced back into a bunker by enemy fire, Littleton threw himself upon a grenade to save his comrades in that crowded space at the cost of his own life.

For his leadership in securing the division's vital flank, 1/7 Marines commander, Lieutenant colonel Webb D. Sawyer was awarded a Navy Cross.

The PVA threat was so great that Smith was forced to place the entire 1st Marine Division on the high ground north of the Chuncheon Corridor to protect the vital Mujon Bridge and several ferry crossings.

It also required a complex set of maneuvers whereby the Marines would have to defend the Pukhan River line, and at the same time move back to Chuncheon.

Air and artillery would keep the PVA at bay while armor and the division's heavy weapons protected the avenues of approach and the river crossings.

Smith's plan was to give ground rapidly in the north while slowly pulling back in the south, letting his westernmost units alternately pass through a series of blocking positions.

Hill 902 (actually a 4,000 feet (1,200 m) mountain top) dominated the road to Chuncheon and protected the concrete Mojin Bridge as well as two ferry sites.

The 11th Marines, reinforced by several Army artillery battalions, was busy registering defensive fires as night fell on 23 April.

A total of 21 sorties (22.6 flight hours) were made from Chuncheon to the front lines then back to the 1st Medical Battalion collecting and clearing station.

Ground personnel and flying officers alike were formed into provisional platoons and assigned defense sectors in case the PVA broke through, and all excess material and equipment was loaded on trucks for movement back to Hongcheon that night.

Farther south, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 1st Marines, manned separate perimeters on Hill 902 overlooking the flat lands of the Chuncheon Corridor.

The 1st and 7th Marines on the left flank were probed as PVA forces searched for crew-served weapons positions and weak spots in the line.

After PVA mortars pounded Banning's Marines for several hours a "human wave" ground assault almost cracked Company G. That this did not happen was a tribute to the actions of Technical Sergeant Harold E. Wilson.

Unable to man a weapon because of painful shoulder wounds, Wilson repeatedly exposed himself to PVA fire while distributing ammunition and directing tactical movements even though he was hit several more times.

Despite the hurried nature of the command change and the fact that it occurred in the midst of a complex combat action, the transition was a smooth one that did not hinder operations.

The first order Thomas received was to pull the 1st Marine Division back to a new position where Korean laborers were toiling night and day to construct a defensive bulwark.

Upon taking command of Eighth Army in December 1950 General Matthew Ridgway adopted mobile defensive tactics to deal with enemy attacks.

There, from carefully selected positions, his troops could trap exposed attackers in preplanned artillery kill zones at the same time air power pummeled ever-lengthening enemy supply routes.

Such was the case when the 1st Marine Division was told to fall back to a section of the No-Name Line located near Hongcheon far to the south.

The movement back to Chuncheon was completed by noon, and the Marines took up defensive positions along the southern banks of the Soyang River on the afternoon of the 27th without incident.

Thomas felt he could adequately cover his zone of action using aerial observation and long-range reconnaissance patrols, so he protested the placement of an entire battalion outside of 105 mm artillery range.

When this request was granted, he sent Nickerson's 7th Marines onto some high ground overlooking the Chuncheon Valley with orders to keep the road open and be prepared to fight its way out if the PVA came down in force.

[2]: 393 The expected second phase of the offensive fell upon ROK units in the east on 16 May with the start of the Battle of the Soyang River, and soon a 30 miles (48 km) penetration threatened the US 2nd Infantry Division on the Marine right.

The critical battle for the pass did not end until daybreak when the PVA vainly tried to pull back, but were instead caught in the open by Marine artillery, mortars, and some belated air strikes.

The Marines on the firing line opened up with everything they had directing rockets, artillery and air support during a five-hour battle that cost the PVA 152 dead and 15 prisoners.