[4] After the uprising began, small Home Army units from various districts of Warsaw also appeared in the Kampinos Forest, having left the city after the failure of the initial Polish attacks during the "W" Hour.

[12][13] After the defeat at the Warszawa Gdańska railway station, the Home Army High Command assigned the Kampinos Group tasks of a primarily passive nature, focusing on receiving Allied airdrops and organizing regular deliveries of weapons and supplies for the fighting capital.

A second focal point of the fighting emerged around the area of Kampinos, Leszno, Borzęcin [pl], and Zaborów, where the enemy tried to drive Polish units deeper into the forest, fearing that their presence in this region might threaten the strategically vital Poznań–Sochaczew–Warsaw road.

[21] On September 14, Major Okoń sent a dispatch to the Chief of Staff of the Home Army Headquarters, General Tadeusz Pełczyński, codenamed Grzegorz, informing that the Germans were tightening the encirclement around the forest and asking for instructions on further actions.

As early as September 12, Okoń had sent a radio dispatch to the Polish headquarters in Brindisi, requesting that, in addition to weapons and ammunition, detailed maps of the Świętokrzyskie Mountains and Silesia be included in the containers dropped by Allied aircraft over the Kampinos Forest.

[22] The news of Okoń's intentions reached the command of the Western District of the Home Army Hajduki, from which one of the strongest units of the Kampinos Group, Major Korwin's Sochaczew Battalion, originated.

[23] However, the decision to retreat to the Świętokrzyskie Mountains was supported by the commanders of those Home Army units whose soldiers were from the Kampinos Forest area or had limited possibilities to hide among the local civilian population.

This request was granted, with the caveat that not only could permanent enemy garrisons be encountered along the route, but also armored and motorized units, alarmed by the march of a strong partisan group.

[28] This count does not include foreigners fighting within the Home Army units (i.e., Hungarian volunteers, Dutch fighters, and Soviet prisoners of war freed from German captivity).

German staff officers were particularly worried that if the Red Army resumed vigorous offensive operations, the Kampinos Group could effectively support potential Soviet efforts to establish bridgeheads on the left bank of the Vistula river (north of Warsaw).

[47] The total strength designated to crush the Kampinos Group surpassed, both in terms of numbers and armaments, the structure of a regular infantry division, indicating the significant importance attached by the Germans to accomplishing this task.

[47][56] Meanwhile, starting from the morning hours, German infantry supported by armored vehicles attacked Polish positions in Brzozówka, Janówek, Pociecha, Zaborów Leśny, and Łubiec.

The retreat to the Świętokrzyskie Mountains had been considered for some time, but the commander of Kampinos Group failed to send the dozens of wounded and sick soldiers to a safe place in advance.

[86] Managing the march of such a large and heavily laden group was a significant challenge, but Okoń did not have his own cavalry escort or personal staff, and he even sent back the platoon of couriers from the 2nd squadron provided by Lieutenant Dolina.

As a result, the Polish units had to retreat to the village of Zamczysko [pl], nearly 8 km away, and from there proceed along side-roads southward,[87][92] passing the western edge of Czarnów and Łuszczewek.

[87][89] The course of this discussion was presented somewhat differently by Okoń's adjutant, Corporal Lucjan Wiśniewski, codenamed Sęp, who claimed that Lieutenant Dolina was the most vigorous in protesting against abandoning the supply wagons, arguing that he had brought them all the way from the Naliboki Forest, and the equipment on the carts might be useful in future operations.

After covering about three kilometers, Major Okoń ordered a stop, instructing the soldiers to leave some of the wounded and sick in the buildings of the estate in Gawartowa Wola and the hospital in Łuszczewek.

Although allied with the Germans, the Hungarians welcomed the Home Army soldiers warmly and not only did not hinder their march but even supplied the Poles with food, some ammunition, and grenades.

[123] At this point, Major Okoń unexpectedly ordered a several-hour halt, instructing the troops to have a meal, set up security, and, as far as possible, position the units under the cover of the small alder carr present in the area.

[116][124][127] Engaging in a fight was highly inadvisable since the Kampinos Group's resting place consisted of extensive marshy meadows, dotted with a small alder carr – a terrain very difficult to defend and favorable to the Germans with their superior firepower.

Lawa, leaving Major Kurs's drop platoon in Budy Zosine, directed the rest of his company to the village of Rozłogi, then took a roundabout route, experiencing many difficulties along the way, but crossed the railway line without losses the next day.

[132] Thanks to reports from agents, alerts from units engaged in the night fight, and information obtained from captured Home Army soldiers, the German command realized that Major Okoń intended to retreat through the Żyrardów and Skierniewice forests towards the Świętokrzyskie Mountains.

After several passes, the pilot lowered the altitude and began strafing the Polish soldiers with onboard weaponry, causing significant casualties and inducing panic among the partisan mounts.

[127][137] Adam Borkiewicz [pl] reported that the German aircraft was shot down by a well-aimed burst from a light machine gun by Second Lieutenant Andrzej Połoński, codenamed Hlebowicz, although this information cannot be verified.

Strzała's soldiers, covered by intense fire from Second Lieutenant Olsza's HMG company, pushed the German infantry to the other side of the railway embankment, reaching close to the tracks.

[142] A group of soldiers from Second Lieutenant Zetes' company (from Cadet Officer Janusz Warmiński's platoon, codenamed Murzyn, and Corporal Art's squad) also seemed to succeed in breaking through.

[153][154] Other senior officers of the group, including the previously very energetic and proactive Lieutenant Dolina, also remained passive, probably demoralized by the course of the battle and Major Okoń's conduct.

On October 1, the Germans, encountering “sporadic and weak enemy resistance”, reached the line of the Bzura river from its mouth to Witkowice, the edge of the forest 1 km northeast of Hilarów, and Sianno.

[209] The German command was not satisfied with the results of Operation Falling Star, as several hundred Home Army soldiers, including several cohesive units, managed to break out of the encirclement.

[212][213] Additionally, about 50 soldiers from Lieutenant Lawa's company, who had separated from the main forces of the Kampinos Group shortly before the battle at Jaktorów, made their way to the Brudzewice Forests behind the Pilica river.