British Empire The Battle of Jitra was fought between the invading Japanese and Allied forces during the Malayan Campaign of the Second World War, from 11–13 December 1941.

The British defeat compelled Arthur Percival to order all Allied aircraft stationed in Malaya to withdraw to Singapore.

[2] Barbed wire lines had been erected and some anti-tank mines laid but heavy rains had flooded the shallow trenches and gun pits.

Many of the field telephone cables laid across the waterlogged ground also failed to work, resulting in a lack of communication during the battle.

[4] The British front line was as long as 14 mi (23 km), stretching across both roads and a railway and far beyond on either side, from the jungle-clad hills on the right, via flooded rice fields and a rubber tree estate to a tidal mangrove swamp on the left.

The first was an armoured train manned by a platoon from the 2/16th Punjab, which was sent to Perlis (almost halfway to Singora) where it blew up a railway bridge and then withdrew to Malaya.

In full daylight, Saeki's men were able to send a flanking party around the Punjabs position forcing them to withdraw before they were cut off.

[citation needed] At this point in the battle, Murray-Lyon arrived at Fitzpatrick's headquarters and ordered him to set up another ambush north of Asun.

Murray-Lyon, Garrett, Fitzpatrick and all four of his company commanders then drove south to see the new ambush site, leaving the 1/14th Punjab to pack up and join them.

Half loaded onto their transport and facing the wrong way, the 1/14th Punjab were surprised by a number of Japanese tanks appearing out of the rain and driving into the middle of the battalion.

[23] The arrival of the survivors of the 1/14th Punjab gave a few minutes warning to the Gurkhas who attempted to blow the bridge, but the heavy rain may have damaged the charges.

Saeki's infantry moved swiftly across the stream on either flank, supported by heavy mortar and machine gun fire.

[27] By late afternoon of 11 December, Murray-Lyon had lost the better part of three battalions and was now without any reserve units to commit to the main battle.

General Arthur Percival refused, fearing that such an early and long retreat would have a demoralising effect on the troops and civilian population.

General Kawamura (commanding the Imperial Japanese Army's 9th Brigade) placed the 11th and 41st Infantry Regiments in readiness to resume the attack that night.

Due to extremely poor communications, Murray-Lyon's orders for withdrawal failed to reach many of his forward companies who were in their positions at daylight of 13 December.

Two hours later, the bridge was blown and the battalion withdrew through a rearguard formed by the 2/9th Gurkha Rifles, who fought another fierce engagement before withdrawing at 04:30; by noon the British had broken away.

[35] Murray-Lyon was to try to hold North Kedah, block Japanese tanks on good natural obstacles and to dispose his forces in depth on the two parallel north–south roads which traversed the rice-growing area, to give greater scope to his artillery.

[citation needed] The Battle of Jitra and the retreat to Gurun had cost the 11th Indian Division heavily in manpower and strength as an effective fighting force.

With the troops tired, units mixed as the result of the fighting, communications broken and the night dark, it was inevitable that orders should be delayed and that in some cases they should never reach the addressees.