As the Soviet Union's disintegration approached during the late 1980s, the enclave's government expressed its desire to secede and unite with the neighbouring Armenian SSR.
Small-scale violence had flared up between the two ethnic groups in February 1988 but soon escalated to use of Soviet-built tanks, helicopters, and fighter bombers appropriated by both sides after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
[14] Meanwhile, internal divisions plagued the Azerbaijani war effort, with Colonel Surat Huseynov moving his units away from the frontline to Ganja after being dismissed from his posts, leaving Kalbajar particularly vulnerable.
[17] In an interview given in April 1993, General Gurgen Dalibaltyan, who planned the operation, explained that its strategic purpose was to "create a reliable connection between Karabakh and Armenia, since Lachin was in a difficult position, surrounded by enemy forces", while also referring to Kalbajar as "our historical homeland".
[17] Questioned on the possibility of a large expulsion of civilians if the region was captured, Melkonian responded, "A lot of blood has been spilled on both sides...
[21] Defeats in late March already had the Azerbaijani military evacuating civilians out of the region to the northern town of Yevlakh and Azerbaijan's second-largest city, Ganja.
[16] The battered village of Charektar in Kalbajar had already seen extensive fighting in earlier weeks and was reinforced by both Azerbaijani and foreign Chechen, Afghan and other fighters as the Armenian offensive commenced on March 27.
Within another twenty kilometres of his forces' positions was the Kalbajar District's namesake capital, a crucial road intersection that led to Lachin and the village of Zulfugarli.
Assessing that most refugees had left, he ordered his units to advance and sent a detachment to guard a vital tunnel leading south towards Zulfugarli.
While his troops had assumed that most civilians had left Kalbajar, they encountered a GAZ-52 transport truck in the tunnel and, thinking it was a military vehicle, fired and destroyed it with rocket-propelled grenades and assault rifles.
[26] After the Zulufgarli incident, his forces pushed forward and reached another vital intersection leading to Ganja, fifteen kilometres away from the capital.
Civilians in Kalbajar continued to be evacuated by both air and the through the intersection and Melkonian halted his advance by a further forty hours to allow the traffic column to move through.
Azerbaijani commander Surat Huseynov and his 709th brigade, which had been tasked to defending the Murov Mountains, had retreated to Ganja after political and military problems began to unravel upon in the battlefield.
[23] An account of the war-weariness afflicting the inhabitants of the town was described by Melkonian's elder brother, Markar: A downcast enemy soldier with a bandaged hand and a burned leg rides up on a donkey and surrenders.
With the taking of the region, Armenian forces now held a continuous swath of territory stretching from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia proper, a total of 3,000 square kilometres.
[30][35][36] On April 30, 1993, Turkey and Pakistan co-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 822 which called for Armenians in the region to withdraw immediately from Kalbajar and "other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan".
[38] In an attempt to end the hostilities, U.S., Russia and Turkey reiterated the call for the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the Kalbajar region of Azerbaijan on May 6, which would be followed by formal peace talks.
[39] The loss of Kalbajar was a significant blow to the authority of President Abulfaz Elchibey and his party, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan.
[16] Two months later, the rebellious commander Surat Huseynov marched his troops on Baku, prompting Elchibey to flee the city and leading to the rise of Heydar Aliyev to the presidency.
[42] While the Nagorno-Karabakh leadership agreed, they asked for a one-month delay, and the plan was never realized as Azerbaijan fell into chaos and Armenian forces began a counter-offensive.