After the government's Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) attempted to corner and destroy a major rebel force under Salim Saleh, the latter lured their pursuers into an ambush and inflicted a heavy defeat on them.

The battle took place after the NRM's armed wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA), had managed to expand its operations and engaged in a series of successful attacks and raids.

The UNLA's main counter-insurgency commander, John Charles Ogole, subsequently organized an operation to destroy the NRA's most important formation, the Mobile Brigade.

After detecting the rebel unit, three UNLA battalions were dispatched and managed to corner the Mobile Brigade in the Singo area of the Luwero Triangle.

[4][5] In February 1981 Museveni and a small band of rebels began attacking UNLA forces, entering the Ugandan Bush War.

Knowing that his force was far smaller and not well equipped, Museveni envisioned that the NRA would wage a long-term "people's war" to gradually undermine Obote's government and build up support across Uganda, starting with the Luwero region where many civilians were already sympathetic to his cause.

[9] Unlike the previous attacks, the Third Battle of Kabamba on 1 January 1985 resulted in the capture of the depot by the NRA's Mobile Brigade under Salim Saleh.

[14] According to Museveni, the result of the battle at Birembo demoralized the UNLA's soldiers, as they reportedly realized that the rebels' abilities were growing instead of declining.

[14][17] Pro-Obote propagandists attempted to frame this event as a rebel retreat, but the UNLA leadership recognized that the Mobile Brigade under Saleh could operate more freely thanks to the removal of slower NRA contingents from the Luwero Triangle.

[14] Consisting of about 1,500 militants,[12] Saleh's forces crossed the Mayanja River and entered the Singo area, where they unsuccessfully continued their evasion attempts and engaged in a number of skirmishes.

The government forces planned to destroy the NRA brigade by using a hammer and anvil strategy, with the pursuing battalions chasing the rebels toward the entrenched UNLA troops at the river.

[19] Meanwhile, the NRA troops had recognized that they were trapped;[14] their signals corps had monitored parts of the UNLA's radio communications, including Ogole's message.

On late 20 June, Saleh called for a meeting of his officers, including Patrick Lumumba, Stephen Kashaka, and Fredrick Mugisha at his ad-hoc headquarters.

[21][19] The insurgent leadership thus planned an L-shaped ambush at the government forces' expected axis of advance at Kembogo, a location east of Bukomero and north of Kapeeka.

[24] The two UNLA battalions then launched a methodical assault on the rebel position, with the infantry advancing under the cover of artillery and machine gun fire.

[26] Eventually, the government troops started to waver due to their heavy losses, whereupon Saleh ordered the 3rd Battalion under Lumumba to launch a counter-attack.

[14][29] According to historians Tom Cooper and Adrien Fontanellaz as well as researcher Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the UNLA lost 200 to 300 soldiers in the battle, while the NRA suffered only 23 dead.

[28] Kainerugaba argued that Ogole's overall plan to destroy the NRA's Mobile Brigade in the area of Singo was sensible and plausible, as the territory was more open than the usual insurgent zones and presented a good opportunity to trap the militants.

[37] The new regime was weak and unstable, and Okello made overtures to anti-Obote rebel groups to form a coalition government and end the fighting.

[39][40] In August 1985, the NRA launched a series of co-ordinated attacks that resulted in the capture of significant amounts of territory in central and western Uganda.

[11] In 2015, Museveni declared the fighting at Kembogo "a decisive battle that brought down the regime of UPC" (Obote's party) and the area "sacred ground for the NRM because many lives were lost here".