Encountering little to no resistance, Japanese troops managed to capture the airfield in one day, as the Dutch defenders were already in retreat inland.

Constructed in 1938, Kendari II Airfield, which was located 27 km from the eponymous city, increased the military significance of the Southeast Celebes Region exponentially.

Before the outbreak of war, Dutch forces had already built barracks that can accommodate 500 troops and planned to expand it more for Australian or KNIL reinforcements.

[4] By 1942, about 3,000 bombs and a million liters of aircraft fuel had been placed on Kendari II to accommodate American bombers who were using the airfield as a staging base to refuel and rearm in their operations against the southern Philippines.

[5] All the same, the airfield is one of the bases that Japanese forces must capture to establish a solid air support network to successfully occupy Java, along with the ones at southern Sumatra, Kuching, Banjarmasin and Makassar.

Dutch plans of defense called for repulsing any landings on the beach, before delaying the enemy advance towards Kendari II and stoutly defend the airfield.

As with other Dutch troops stationed in the Outer Regions (outside Java), the defenders must resort to guerrilla warfare in the case that regular defense could not be conducted anymore.

Yet eventually, as these trucks were more often used by Dutch personnel at Kendari II for barracks construction and fuel supplying, the motorization plan falls apart.

[1] To make matters more difficult, Dutch defenders had not come up with demolition plans for the airfield by late December 1941, when the war was in full swing.

A NEFIS (Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service) report published after the war remarked that Dutch leadership in Kendari had little confidence that they can adequately defend the airfield, with Anthonio himself stating: "What can we do with 400 men?

The plan calls for the landing in Kendari to be conducted 43 days after the general Japanese offensives on 8 December began, which will be on 20 January.

[16] The day after the first bombing raid, the entire Indonesian crew of the AA detachment and several troops deserted, forcing Anthonio to send out two brigades to apprehend them.

[17] When the Japanese invasion fleet was approaching, Staring Bay and Kendari anchorage was already cleared of Allied shipping, except for the American seaplane tender USS Childs, who had arrived on the night of 22 January.

It was only because of the green paint and tilted position that Childs was saved from any follow-up attacks.The arrival of the high tide helped repositioned the ship again.

[18] When a schooner was spotted sailing nearby, Pratt was convinced that Japanese forces are monitoring his ship, and got Childs underway at 05:25 on 24 January.

Rodney Nordenfelt, the signalman, simply returned the signal back, giving time for Pratt to change course to a narrow channel in full speed under the cover of heavy rain squall.

Pratt now directed the seaplane tender to steam southeast at full speed to avoid possible encounter with Japanese warships.

At 06:00, Van Straalen noticed the sight of Japanese planes and the sound of artillery fires and attempted to contact Anthonio but failed.

[21] When he received word about the fleet sightings, Anthonio drove to the Kendari coastline, where he personally saw the warships and transport ships, before driving back to Mandongan.

There, he organized Aronds' troops around a defensive position, before report of the landing in Sampara made him drove to Kendari City; Anthonio feared that Japanese fighters will strafe him if he head for the airfield instead.

Visibility was very limited due to the intense rain, resulting in the destroyer Hatsuharu to collide with 1st Base Force commander's flagship, Nagara while steaming at a high speed of 21 knots.

As the result, Nagara's starboard side and upper structures was damaged, while Hatsuharu's bow up to the turret and fore gun was crushed.

Escorted by Nenohi and Wakaba, Hatsuharu also sailed for Davao for repairs, leaving the reinforcement for 1st Base Force reduced considerably.

[26] After the capture of Kendari II, Dutch troops went in a headlong retreat to Tawanga town on the Koneweha River, where from there they would begin the guerrilla fight.

[27] Lt. Aronds' group, which was down to just 4 (including himself), had joined forces with Anthonio near Mandiodo, a coastal village northwest of Kendari City.

The combined group arrived at Tawanga on 31 January and began to set up their base, including a radio station at Sanggona.

[29] The troops on Kendari II (divided under Schalen, Vellinga and Bruijnius) headed southward, not knowing of the rendezvous point at Tawanga.

Incessant Japanese air raids eventually forced Van Straalen to move the guerrilla base 16 km west to Paraboea (Parabua).

[31] In overall, a lack of firm leadership and organization from Anthonio and Van Straalen played a significant role in the swift Japanese victory at Kendari.

The guerrilla campaign that followed afterwards yield little results due to the absence of local population support that stems from fear of the Japanese and their disregard for Dutch troops.