[9][1][10] Having descended into Mutten valley and waiting for the rest of the troops to arrive, Suvorov sent a hundred mounted Cossacks on the morning of the 28th to the right, toward the side of Glarus, to gather some information about Friedrich von Linken.

It was no longer a vague rumor, like the one carried in Altdorf: Korsakov and Hotze are smashed and far thrown back, Jellacic (Jelačić) retreated, a strong French corps occupied Glarus, and Masséna pulls together troops to Schwyz.

According to a comment of the 1799 war's historian, Dmitry Milyutin, Masséna's attack on the Limmat had, in its general course, very much in common with Suvorov's passage through the Adda, but at the same time Korsakov did not resemble Moreau at all.

The right flank, under the command of General Durasov [ru], remained idle during this affair, deceived by the French demonstrations; it wandered at random and only by chance escaped annihilation.

If to all this add a preponderance of forces on the French side, it becomes clear why Rimsky-Korsakov was subjected to a complete defeat at Zurich and his corps suffered terrible losses.

[10] Other separate Austrian detachments, although they avoided the Korsakov and Hotze's deplorable fate, but also completely abandoned Suvorov, Jellacic and Linken, fulfilling the campaign's general plan, moved forward; the first of them, meeting stubborn resistance and then hearing about the disaster at Linth, fell into such a panic that he retreated across the Rhine to Maienfeld.

The first to appear at the meeting was Bagration; Suvorov, in full field-marshal's uniform, greatly disturbed and agitated, paced about the room, uttering curt words, the ineptitude of warfare, the art of being beaten, and so on.

Suvorov met them with a bow, closed his eyes, as if gathering his thoughts, and then with fire in his gaze, with an animated face began to speak strongly, vigorously, even solemnly.

Explaining briefly what happened at the Limmat, at the Linth, and with the rest of the Austrian detachments, Suvorov, not restraining his indignation, recalled all the difficulties in the course of the Italian campaign, which constantly had from Thugut and the Hofkriegsrat.

testify that Suvorov, seeing himself trapped, became so furious that he decided to knock the French out of Schwyz and go to the rear of his enemy's army, and that only the persistent persuasion of several persons kept him from such a desperate intention.

[citation needed] Russian sources say the opposite, and one of the campaign participants claimed that Austrian officers of the general staff pointed Suvorov to Schwyz as the best course of action, but he did not agree.

It was not that Suvorov, whom everyone was accustomed to see in battle, on the campaign, in the camp, then formidable, then joking and whimsical, but always looking forward with full confidence in success, and did not allow the thought of failure, much less defeat.

Then all, as if "by prior agreement", glances turned to Wilhelm Derfelden, who enjoyed universal respect for his personal and military qualities in addition to his seniority.

[10] Suvorov's disposition of troops instructed Rosenberg's corps to remain in the rearguard and hold their enemy from Schwyz until all the packs had passed over Mount Bragell (now Pragel).

Those who took part in the council of war bowed to Suvorov and went away, carrying in their hearts an unprecedented impression and retaining traces of it in their facial expressions; especially Derfelden and Pyotr Bagration looked angrily and menacingly.

[10] Having ascertained that Suvorov must already be at the Muottental, Masséna ordered some of his troops to concentrate there, and others to reinforce Molitor around Glarus, so as thus to lock up to the Russians these two only exits from the trap into which they had fallen.

Auffenberg, notified of Bagration's approach, broke off negotiations; Molitor, firmly convinced that Masséna would not let Suvorov out of the Muottental, pursued the Austrians hotly, considering them his sure prey.

The inclement weather continued; large drops of rain interspersed with flakes of snow; impenetrable fog made it impossible to see anything within ten paces.

Attacked from the front and flank, threatened from the rear, Molitor hastily retreated and was pursued along the narrow mountain road for 6.4 kilometres (4.0 mi), losing not a few men killed, wounded and captured.