Battle of Krasnohorivka

[6][7] After the Russian capture of Marinka at the end of 2023 and the fall of Avdiivka in February 2024, Krasnohorivka was the last remaining stronghold of Ukraine in this sector of the frontline.

It was reported that Ukraine's 3rd Assault Brigade knocked Russian forces out of the southeastern part of Krasnohorivka by the end of the month.

[15] Between 10 and 13 April, Russian forces managed to regain some lost positions in the initial Ukrainian counterattack and reportedly continued armored advances towards the Krasnohorivka refractory plant [uk] (brick factory).

[16][17] Between 15 and 16 April, Russian forces captured the railway station [uk], several private buildings around Zaliznychna Street and the abandoned auto-repair plant in the south of the city.

Also on 16 April, a drone video emerged showing a Russian 'turtle tank' freely roaming in southern Krasnohorivka and advancing up to Istorychna and Akhtyrskoho Streets, just south of the refractory plant.

The new Ukrainian defense line would thus be pushed back to the Eastern Microraion, hospital complex, and Agricultural College areas.

[22][23] Meanwhile, a spokesman for Ukraine's Khortytsia operational-strategic group said that its units, mainly the 59th Brigade, had blocked the Russians inside the refractory plant.

[25] Further reports by some Russian sources made on 18 May cited continued clashes along Tsentralna and Sumska streets in central Krasnohorivka.

[27] Between 22 and 23 May, a few Ukrainian and Russian sources said that Russia captured Alexandrovskoye farm base, a warehouse area, on the western outskirts of the city.

[29] By 9 June, the Russians had captured buildings on both sides of the western half of Sumska Street and had also advanced around 750 m southwest of the city along the railroad to Hostre.

[42] On 9 September, geolocated footage showed that Russian forces had advanced to capture the last Ukrainian-held portion of Krasnohorivka, seizing control of the westernmost outskirts of the city.

[45][46] To make it even harder for drone operators to hit the turtle tanks, an improved design included the integration of anti-drone defenses in the form of a cluster of radio jammers.

Rob Lee, an analyst with the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, described it as an adaptation by Russian forces to the current conditions on the battlefield in which Ukraine has a lot of FPV drones but very few heavier weapons.

This was mainly a result of the months-long delaying campaign of U.S. aid to Ukraine, which included American-made artillery shells and Javelin anti-tank missiles.