Both sides changed tactics after the first week of the invasion, the Germans constructed a defence-in-depth, with tank forces reserved for limited counter-attacks, intended to slow the Allied advance inland and avoid casualties and losses of equipment until reinforcements arrived.

The Allies began to accumulate supplies to conduct attrition attacks, rather than persist with mobile operations by large numbers of tanks supported by infantry.

An attack by the 7th Armoured Division through Tilly-sur-Seulles on Villers-Bocage and Évrecy, required that all German units further east be engaged to prevent them moving westwards.

[4] If the attack succeeded, II Battalion, SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 26 (Obersturmbannführer Wilhelm Mohnke) would be cut off and destroyed, leaving a gap in the positions of the 12th SS-Panzer Division, exposing Carpiquet, the rear of Caen and the confluence of the Odon and Orne rivers.

The commander of the 1st Hussars had no time to conduct a reconnaissance with the R Group (a reconnaissance group composed of attached arms, an artillery representative and the squadron leaders) and then complete an appreciation of the situation before issuing orders; the squadron commanders would have then issued detailed orders to the troop leaders.

When the 1st Hussars were established at Le Mesnil-Patry, the 10th and 27th CAR could attack southwards to the high ground and make Caen untenable.

[9] The 6th CAR had recently received twenty replacement tanks and crews, who had not had time to settle in and few of the men had much idea of the plan.

The 6th CAR advanced south across the highway and railway tracks, with B Squadron forward, carrying D Company of the Queen's Own Rifles (QOR) on the backs of the tanks.

South of the railway was a knocked out Panther, A couple of nervous troops immediately deployed upon sighting it and several tanks engaged the hulk with direct fire.

The advance through the fields between Norrey and Le Mesnil-Patry was intended to begin at the same time as the attack further west against Cristot but this was delayed.

The Canadian advance had been reported and as the vanguard reached the village centre, German artillery and mortar fire began while the QOR, on the backs of the tanks, were exposed.

[13]The Shermans were easy targets in the narrow streets and drove for open country, while the QOR were left to fight the German infantry.

C Squadron moved to the right to give covering fire but was mistakenly engaged by British anti-tank gunners of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division.

The Commandos attacked down the valley from Thaon and captured Cairon, Lasson and Rosel; in the evening the force entered Le Hamel and Rots.

[21] During the night, The Fort Garry Horse and the infantry of the Chaudières concentrated between Bray and Rots, about 3 mi (4.8 km) behind the front line, ready to forestall an attempt by the Germans to exploit the confusion and attack northwards towards the coast.

[25] The attack began at 2:30 p.m. with the 6th Green Howards and the tanks of the 4/7th Dragoons but the SS-Panzeraufklärungsabteilung 12 (12th SS-Reconnaissance Battalion) had arrived around Cristot earlier in the day.

German tanks attacked across the Green Howards axis of advance, who were then ordered to retire westwards, to the high ground of Point 103 to avoid encirclement.

[19] The 7th Green Howards advance from the west also failed, as the battalion was stopped by machine-gun fire along the Bayeux–Caen railway embankment near Brouay.

The 5th East Yorks were caught in the open when moving to relieve the 1st Dorsets, during the preparatory artillery bombardment for a German counter-attack on Point 103 and suffered many casualties.

Having experienced similar losses to those of the 12th SS-Panzer Division during the first few days, the Anglo-Canadians began to accumulate resources to conduct set-piece attrition attacks.

[28] The Germans changed tactics and began to limit counter-attacks to restore a defence in depth, rather than continue the failed counter-offensive against the invasion.

[30] Rots was consolidated by the Chaudières, who were reported to have buried 122 Panzergrenadiers; 46 Royal Marine Commando suffered 17 killed, 9 wounded and 35 missing.

[27] When the fighting in the area diminished after 14 June, Sergeant Gariepy, commander of the B Squadron tank which had escaped from Le Mesnil-Patry and the 1st Hussar padre went out to identify the dead and recover identity discs.

Bettridge later wrote that After the tanks retreated from there, the Germans got up and started searching for anybody that was still alive and they just put a bullet through all their heads so the six of them were all killed, all murdered.following the action at Le Mesnil-Patry, troops of the 12th SS-Panzer Division captured seven Canadians, who had been wandering around no-man's land since the battle, all being tired and hungry.

The men were interrogated by an officer of the 12th SS-Pioneer Battalion at an ad hoc headquarters in the village of Mouen, about 5 mi (8.0 km) south-east of Le Mesnil-Patry.

Cook, Cranfield, Perry and Willett were killed by a firing squad and the remaining men were shot in the head at close-range.

[33] In the First Canadian Army report it was concluded That all the above named soldiers were murdered by the German armed forces in violation of the well recognised laws and usages of war and the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1929.

[37] Four members of the 12th SS-Panzer Division were prosecuted for the crime: On 21 October 1948, proceedings were opened against Bernhard Siebken, Dietrich Schnabel, Heinrich Albers, and Fritz Bundschuh before a British military court in Hamburg.

On 9 November 1948, the court announced its verdict: Albers and Bundschuh, the trigger men, were acquitted on the grounds that they had followed superior orders, while Siebken, the battalion commander, and Schnabel, his special missions officer, were found guilty of having issued and carried out the execution order.Siebken and Schnabel were sentenced to death and hanged at Hamelin Prison on January 20, 1949.