Shown in the center of the figure left, on 22 December 1941, the Japanese 14th Army—under Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma—landed on the northeastern shores of the gulf, at Agoo, Caba, Santiago and Bauang, where they engaged in a number of relatively minor skirmishes[5] with the defenders, a poorly equipped contingent of predominantly American and Filipino troops.

The narrow base of the roughly rectangular Lingayen Gulf provided a relatively small landing area, only 25–30 miles wide, but its assault forces needed to take only a 100-mile overland route South to reach Luzon's capital city of Manila, shown clearly at left.

Commencing around noon on 6 January 1945, a heavy naval and air bombardment of suspected Japanese defenses on Lingayen began from their position inside the Gulf, the base of which is shown in the figure above.

[13] Ian W. Toll writes that on 7 January, "in response to urgent requests from Admiral Kinkade and General MacArthur, Halsey threw his "big blue blanket" over Luzon."

"[14] On the 8th, it was observed that in the town of Lingayen, as a response to the pre-landing bombardment, Filipinos had begun to form a parade, complete with United States and Philippine flags; fire was shifted away from that area.

Despite their success in driving out the Japanese forces stationed there, the Americans and their mostly Australian allies suffered relatively heavy losses; particularly to their convoys, due to kamikaze attacks.

But a lack of radar signals, a common and vexing problem during the battle, had led the task group to believe that the Japanese planes had withdrawn, and the kamikaze attack took the lookouts by complete surprise.

[23][24] Considered sunk by Naval statistics, her kamikaze strike, though coming early in the battle, represented the greatest loss of life to a single ship with 93 killed and 65 wounded.

[30] The heavy cruiser HMAS Australia was the only invasion ship struck five times, though her considerable casualties of forty-four dead and seventy-two wounded were the result of only the first two strikes, of which only the second caused serious damage.

While roughly 50 miles (80 km) northwest of Manila Bay on her approach to the mouth of the Gulf to provide fire support for the Lingayen landings at San Fabian, Australia was struck portside amidships at 17:35 on 5 January.

[42] At 03:45 on the morning of 7 January, Commander Loud's Hovey, with her load of survivors from both Long and Brooks still crammed aboard, was positioned, along with the rest of the large minesweeper group, off the northwest corner of the Gulf, abreast of Cape Balinao.

Steaming ahead were the destroyer escorts Barton, Walke, Radford, and Leutze, intending to provide support against coastal batteries, including those stationed off Cape Balinao, if necessary.

[52][53] At 07:53, on 11 January 1945, the Clemson-class destroyer USS Belknap was forced to train all her guns on a Japanese kamikaze which eventually crashed her number two stack, nearly disabling her engines, and resulting in the death of 38 and wounding 49 of her crew.

[54] One of the worst losses of life was suffered by merchant marine vessel SS Kyle V. Johnson at 18:30 on 12 January, when a kamikaze dive, among a group of six attacking enemy planes, started a large fire, killing 120 men.

[55] With few enemy planes remaining on Luzon, the kamikazes went after victims of opportunity, the slower, cargo ships, which certainly had poorer air defenses than battleships and cruisers, yet represented a large target, that may have had somewhat limited mobility due to their size, weight, and weather conditions in the gulf.

At 08:58 on 13 January, the escort carrier USS Salamaua was struck by an unidentified kamikaze who dove almost vertically at too great a speed to give the ship's gunners time to respond.

[56] According to several naval historians, kamikazes were likely used more successfully by the Japanese at Lingayen Gulf, and beginning in the last two weeks of December 1944 in the Western Philippine islands of the Visayas and Mindoro, than in any other Pacific conflict with the possible exception of the Battle of Okinawa.

[63] The single Mabalacat kamikaze departing around midday on 6 January, and those from Angeles and Echague may have been responsible for strikes on any of the ten ships struck around noon that day including the battleship New Mexico or the destroyers Leary, Allen M. Sumner, Long or Brooks.

[70] As Robert Ross Smith noted, of the very roughly one to one hundred fifty Japanese aircraft that had attacked American Admiral Oldendorf's naval forces at Lingayen Gulf between 2 and 13 January 1945, the vast majority had tried kamikaze crashes, even if they had not been successful.

Smith states, "Flight tactics included radical maneuvering designed not only to avoid antiaircraft fire and Allied planes but also to confuse observers as to which ship was the actual target."

As noted by Smith, "kamikazes continually slipped through the air cover, and the CVE-based (Carrier Escort) planes had knocked down less than half of all Japanese aircraft destroyed from 2 through 6 January.

[76] The argument could also be made that once within Lingayen Gulf, the current, shoals, winds, waves, and storms that the gulf was known for made maneuvering the advancing Allied ships somewhat more difficult, and more likely to break formation and become isolated, though the prevailing weather for the advancing convoy west of Luzon was far better than the weather experienced by the fast carriers of Fast Carrier Task Force 38, North and East of Luzon which significantly hampered the operation of their air defenses.

During the invasion's forces preliminary approach, it was also noted, that "overcast conditions prevailed due to intermediate type cloudiness, and occasional areas of very light precipitation were encountered.

Nonetheless, it appears likely the majority of the more damaging hits on escort carriers, evidenced by the table below, were done from kamikazes diving from a high altitude so as to penetrate their decks, as suggested by their training.

The winds, waves, light rain, and overcast skies would have made smaller craft such as destroyers and minesweepers particularly vulnerable to kamikazes as they would experience less stability in rough seas than a larger ship, affecting their maneuverability while under attack.

The naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison noted that at least on 6 January, "the minecraft themselves bore the brunt of the attack this day owing to their distance from supporting ships."

Of interest to some, the Clemson-class destroyer/minesweeper USS Southard, which was struck by a kamikaze on 6 January 1945 in Lingayen Gulf but sustained only moderate damage to her deck after fires were extinguished, would later be caught in Typhoon Louise at Okinawa and scuttled while the author Herman Wouk was serving as a lieutenant.

Rear Admiral Forest B. Royal, stated that "full power and evasive course, combined with rapid and accurate gunfire, proved to be an effective defense against suicide dives."

Admiral Kinkaid summarized the best strategy for defense when he stated that a well-trained and skilled pilot who was intent on crashing his plane, "is almost certain to succeed if unopposed by anti-aircraft fire, regardless of what maneuvers the ship attempts."

Those ships highlighted in blue can be selected and their accompanying pages searched for Philippines, or Lingayen to find the exact manner in which they were attacked by enemy aircraft, most often kamikazes.