The Grand Pensionary and leading Dutch politician, Johan de Witt and other members of the States-General, formed a commission to supervise Obdam,[6] which gave him detailed instructions comprising 26 articles, ordering him to attack the English aggressively when and where he could do them most damage.

[7][8] Although the Dutch had ordered the construction of many new warships, during and after the First Anglo-Dutch War, including several comparable to the all but the largest English ships to augment the existing fleet, not all of these were completed or fitted out by 1665.

[9] To complete Oddam's fleet, eighteen older warships that had been laid up after the First Anglo-Dutch War were reactivated, and several very large Dutch East India Company built hybrid ships were added.

[10] Perhaps realising that his fleet was still too inferior in organisation, training, discipline and firepower to challenge the English successfully in a decisive battle, Obdam prepared to postpone the fight until the wind turned favourable in order to seek a limited confrontation, with his fleet in a defensive leeward position from which it could disengage quickly and return to its ports without openly disobeying orders.

[12] The instructions issued by the commission headed by de Witt insisted on specifying that the Dutch fleet's order of battle should involve its division into a seven squadrons with a total of 21 flag officers for political reasons.

Obdam decided to attack and he now approached the enemy,[19] possibly fearing that if the wind became more westerly, it would favour the English fleet even more.

[23] Although Obdam has been accused of lack both of leadership and tactical insight, masked in earlier battles where Egbert Bartholomeusz Kortenaer, who had been promoted to be a lieutenant-admiral at Lowestoft, had been his flag captain.

[24] Although the English found Obdam's behaviour puzzling, his tactical decisions may relate to his appreciation that his out-gunned, poorly organised fleet could only succeed in battle under ideal conditions and needed to be able to disengage if it risked defeat.

[32] Penn's solution to the developing Dutch threat, was bold: soon after 7am[33] he steered the Royal Charles and the bulk of the Red Squadron to the west to form a second battleline to prevent Obdam gaining the weather gage.

[40] In theory, their being in a leeward position would have given the Dutch guns greater range, allowing them to destroy the rigging of the English ships from a safe distance with chain shot, but in reality the seven squadrons began to block each other's line of fire.

[44] The fiercest fighting of the early afternoon was between Obdam's and Sandwich's squadrons, the latter of which was concentrating its fire and heavily damaging the opposing Dutch ships.

[48] Both Sandwich, who was close to the centre of the action and, simultaneously but independently, Rupert further away, noticed the Dutch disarray, and embarked on attacks which were to decide the outcome of the battle.

[50] To the north, Tromp and Cornelis Evertsen tried to seize the weather gage from Rupert, who retained it while continuing to inflict severe damage to his opponents.

The last, who was untalented and little regarded was decapitated, leading the poet Andrew Marvell, using the pseudonym John Denham) to write a brutal epitaph: "His shattered head the fearless Duke disdains, and gave the last first proof that he had Brains".

[52] The loss of the flagship and death of its commander, just as the English Blue and White squadrons were attacking, seriously affected Dutch morale, which was further damaged by the uncertainty over his successor.

[53] The next most senior flag officer was Johan Evertsen of Zeeland, who was distrusted by the politicians of the dominant province of Holland, who had therefore nominated Egbert Kortenaer to be Obdam's successor before the battle.

A complete Dutch rout was prevented only by what ships rallied to Evertsen or Tromp and the action of the Oranje, which fought off several opponents for around two hours until, shattered and sinking it surrendered and was burned.

[56] Tromp later claimed that his rearguard action prevented greater losses, as many of the fleeing Dutch ships' crews were demoralised and would not fight any English pursuers.

Tromp led one group to Texel, followed by Rupert, Johan Evertsen retreated with another contingent to the Maas (French: Meuse) pursued by the rest of the English fleet, and other ships headed for the Scheldt.

[55] However, the English commanders did not order a general chase by releasing their faster ships to overtake the slower of the Dutch fugitives, but remained in squadron.

An account which relies on the reported testimonies of Penn and Harman suggests that Lord Henry Brouncker, James' master of the bedchamber, either from fear or because he had promised the Duchess of York to keep the Duke from danger, first approached William Penn, the Captain of the Fleet asking him to slacken sail, reminding him that the Duke was heir presumptive and that his death would be a disaster.

Brouncker next approached the captain of the Royal Charles John Harman, this time pretending that the order to take in sail did come from James.

According to some accounts, the Oranje lost half of its crew of 400 before succumbing, a severely wounded Senten (rumoured to be an expatriate Scotsman) was picked up by an English vessel and shortly after he also died.

[62] During the Dutch flight, the English captured nine more ships: Hilversum, Delft, Zeelandia, Wapen van Edam and Jonge Prins; the VOC-ship Nagelboom and the merchants Carolus Quintus, Mars and Geldersche Ruyter.

Notable English admirals and captains present at the battle included William Penn in the Royal Charles, Christopher Myngs and George Ayscue.

[63] That possibility became more remote as senior Dutch sea officers and politicians began to consider the reasons for the disaster at Lowestoft and identified three principal causes.

Although there had been a significant building programme after the First Anglo-Dutch War, only Eendracht and Groot Hollandia, built as fleet flagship, were comparable to English ships of the third-rate.

The Admiralty of Zeeland instructed its flag officers and captains to avoid lengthy and disadvantageous gun battles and to practice drills aimed at boarding and capturing enemy ships.

These instructions implicitly criticised the division of the fleet at Lowestoft into seven squadrons with unclear chains of command but also Obdam's cautious tactics.