One of them was the Army of Upper Danube of about 28,000, led by Major General Artúr Görgei, deployed from the Nádas Pass in the Little Carpathians to the southern shore of Lake Fertő.

Major General Mór Perczel had about 9-10 000 soldiers stationed along the Mura river, keeping an eye on the enemy who was preparing to invade Hungary from Croatia and Styria.

[2] Görgei's hussars defeated the enemy units advancing with overconfidence in a rearguard action in the Battle of Moson, and therefore Windisch-Grätz decided not to launch a frontal attack against the Hungarian army, but to surround it.

[2] Lajos Kossuth, the Chairman of the National Defence Commission (OHB), the country's true leader, asked Görgei to defend Győr.

Because of the distance, the majority of the troops ordered from Bácska and Bánság could only join Görgei's army, only at the end of December or the beginning of January when he already retreated in Budapest.

[4] Perczel is one of the most interesting personalities of the War of Independence, he was a talented soldier but immensely self-confident (he claimed that he saved the country at least three times in 1848–49, while everyone was plotting against him...), and considered anyone who did not think the same as he did a traitor.

[5] He outlined a purely illusory battle plan: he demanded that Görgeit defend a front of some 25-30 kilometers wide so that the troops could resist outnumbering enemy attacks at any point of it.

He did not inform even the brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel János Horváth, sent by Görgei to maintain contact between their armies, who only learned of the battle from the sound of the cannonade.

According to a post-operation diary written in 1850, Mór lies on the side of Csóka Hill in a narrow valley through which the small Gaja stream flows.

The elevated plain on which the country town lies descends on three sides and forms a gentle curve with the opposite slopes of the Sárkány Ridge to the north, which is cut across by the main road.

The enemy, however, did not tie himself to the road, as the forest to the west of it was very sparse and could be traversed with little effort by artillery, and, moreover, the position from Mór was dominated from the opposite heights.

So it wasn't hard to calculate that such a position was almost undefendable... [9] According to an officer, The hills and forests to the west of the city were ceded to the imperialists, [thus] our whole army stretched like an open book [in front of them] along a huge plain.

[9] Another participant in the battle wrote that our position was extremely bad; the forest was not far from us, in which the enemy could arrange his army to attack without being harmed or even noticed.

[13] Jelačić had intended to give his troops a rest day on 30 December, but at his headquarters in Kisbér he was informed that Perczel had left the settlement that morning with 8,000-10,000 men (according to other sources, 8,000 infantry, 600-800 cavalry and 24 guns) and marched to Mór.

[14] It was also mentioned, according to the diary of Hermann Dahlen, the Ban's aide-de-camp, that Mór lies in the middle of the vast Bakony forest, from which the enemy can easily slip away under cover of darkness through an area unknown to us.

[14] After the officers expressed their fear that Windisch-Grätz would prevent them from attacking with some counter-order, Jelačić vowed to lead them against the enemy, to reach Perczel, he added with a laugh, even if I have to chase him to Asia.

[19] The left wing was positioned in front of a hill pass at Timár, opposite the portion of the forest from where Perczel expected the Austrians to attack.

[24] Ottinger received orders to hurry his march to the battlefield at about 10 a.m., and after half an hour of trotting, the brigade of two regiments of cuirassiers finally arrived.

[30] The 48th Battalion and the Bereg Company, which were on their left, repulsed the attack of the cuirassiers with volley fire after they formed a mass, and even temporarily recaptured the three guns from the enemy, but they could not tow them away, because they had no horses.

The other five companies of the 48th Battalion, led by Major Miklós Perczel, retreated in order to Csákvár, where they joined Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Karger's brigade with around 500 other fleeing soldiers from other units.

[33] In the meantime, the Wallmoden and the Hardegg cuirassiers, who had arrived there, had captured or slaughtered all but twenty of the crew at the entrance of Mór in the terrible tumult and confusion.

[35] Perczel later wrote - apparently based on reports from other refugees - that the soldiers of the 35th and 50th Honvéd Battalions were still fighting hard in the town and shot down many of the enemy.

As an indication of the fierce fighting in the town, the Hardegg cuirassiers dismounted and cleared the houses of the honvéds who were firing at them, by killing them one by one, without mercy, in a terrible massacre.

[38] The Hungarian troops on the right flank were led by the Chief of General Staff Ferenc Meszéna, who withdrew them through Pusztakápolna and Gánt towards Csákvár, shortly after the massive Austrian attack against the center.

[40] Those who fled from Mór poured to Pest in groups, and their appearance and their accounts about the defeat discouraged the Committee of National Defence (which was, de facto, the independent Hungarian government, after the open conflict with the Habsburgs started).

[34] According to Zámbelly, Karger returned to Csákvár after receiving news of the defeat of the Perczel corps, and blocked the roads leading there from Mór with cut-down trees.

On 20 December, Kossuth had entrusted General Staff Major Bódog Nemegyei with the formation of a volunteer mobile militia in the Transdanubian counties.

Having been informed that Perczel had received help (probably he heard about the advance of Karger's brigade, or about Nemegyei's detachment), Jelačić did not use the reinforcements which arrived, to launch another attack, but he halted his troops.

A platoon of the 3rd Cuirassier Regiment led by Lieutenant Cadoudal and a part of the Banderial Hussars escorted the large number of prisoners to Vienna.

[44] The most important consequence of the defeat was that the Army of the Upper Danube led by Görgei had to take over the defense of all roads leading to the capital, thus overstretching its already very thin line.