After the Battle of Spicheren on 6 August, the German High Command under Graf Helmuth von Moltke the Elder believed that the French Army of the Rhine would not fight on the eastern side of the Moselle.

[2] At 1800 on 14 August, Moltke ordered the Second Army under Prince Friedrich Karl to prepare to cross the Moselle and send all available cavalry to the area between Metz and Verdun to ascertain the French movements.

[5] The 6th Infantry Division erected a light pontoon bridge at Champey, sending its artillery and supply trains to cross at Pont-à-Mousson.

[7] At 1830 on 15 August, Moltke ordered Second Army to cut off the French line of retreat along the Metz-Verdun roads and left to Friedrich Karl's judgement the best means to accomplish this task.

[8] Friedrich Karl had already made clear in an 1100 telegram to royal headquarters that reports from III Corps had convinced him that the French were retreating toward the Meuse with full speed and the Second Army would have to hurry to cut them off.

[9] The French staff officers were busy organizing the supply trains and road traffic, when the battle of Mars-la-Tour began at 0900 on 16 August.

[13][12] In the evening of 15 August, Voigts-Rhetz ordered the 5th Cavalry Division under General Paul von Rheinbaben to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force against the French positions near Rezonville.

[19] A cavalry brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Rauch that was advancing on the heights, was fired upon from the Bois de Vionville and was forced to retreat after heavy losses.

[22] They received reports from III Corps outposts and the 6th Cavalry Division of French forces advancing on Gorze along the Rezonville plateau.

[22] Commanded by Colonel von Garrelts, the 1st and 2nd musketeer battalions of the 48th Infantry Regiment advanced, the 1st on the left and the 2nd on right with each in a two-line formation, up the ridge to capture the Bois de Vionville and had by 1015 made sufficient progress for the 1st light artillery battery under Captain Stüphasius to unlimber on their flank and for General von Döring to move up the rest of his men in support.

[24] To the east, the Prussian Guard Regiment advanced directly north from Gorze and two of its battalions slowly pushed back Lapasset's brigade in the Bois de St.

[33] Two German regiments, the 35th and 64th, launched an exemplary coordinated attack on Vionville, throwing their companies forward in well-organized bounds, using ravines and woods to cover their approach, gaining fire superiority at 300 meters and assaulting the village from the north, west and south at 1130.

[39] Regiments from the 6th and 5th Infantry Divisions stormed the village from the west and the south, firming up the center of the III Corps battle line for the rest of the day.

[42] With Vionville and Flavigny lost and the French 2nd Army Corps retreating toward Rezonville, Bazaine and Frossard at 1230 ordered the cavalry to stabilize the course of the battle.

[44] Lieutenant Colonel Leo von Caprivi, chief of staff of X Corps, advised Rauch's 17th Hussars to charge the disorganized French cuirassiers at 1245.

[47] 6th Cavalry Division was thus halted on the Rezonville plateau at 1300 by an onslaught of French infantry and artillery fire before it could even fully deploy and was forced to withdraw both of its brigades after heavy casualties.

[54] To protect the German position, Alvensleben sent his chief of staff, Colonel von Voigts Rhetz, to Bredow with orders to silence Canrobert's batteries along the Roman road.

[56] It was at this moment that Bazaine ordered Canrobert's 6th Army Corps to stop its attack and the pressure on the Prussian 6th Infantry Division ceased.

[61] Fire from French skirmisher swarms and mitrailleuses overwhelmed Barby's cavalry at 500-meters range and the Germans fell back slowly on Tronville.

[63][64] 20th Infantry Division's staff officers and Kraatz personally reconnoitered the vicinity of Tronville and Flavigny and identified the III Corps center as badly weakened.

[66] Prince Friedrich Karl did not become aware of the precariousness of III Corps struggle until 1400, when a report from Kraatz informed him of the situation.

[72][73] The III Corps and French infantry positions on the plateau, reinforced by strong artillery forces, were so firm that frontal attacks would be impossible.

[75] Two German battalions of 78th East Friesland Regiment under Colonel von Lyncker attempted to capture a height (989) south of Rezonville but failed after a few hundred meters.

[75] Two grenadier battalions of the 12th Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel von Kalinowski, supported by two 16th Infantry Division artillery batteries, pushed forward a line of skirmishers to a valley below the 989 height.

[78] Meanwhile, half of 19th Infantry Division under General Emil von Schwartzkoppen reached Tronville and Kraatz requested that they attack the French right wing to the north-east.

[101] The warm summer day gave way to a cold night, as the troops rested in their bivouacs and the lines of outposts maintained a watch over the blood-soaked fields.

[102] After a stream of reports on the battle from III and X Corps and present staff officers, the royal headquarters in the afternoon of 16 August ordered 1st Army under Steinmetz to prepare to cross the Moselle over to the left bank.

[105] Citing the need to acquire more ammunition and the distance from the supply trains, Bazaine issued an order on the night of 16–17 August for his army to fall back closer to Metz.

[56] Its success won it renown among military historians, which created a myth to the effect that for some decades 'Bredow’s achievement was the norm', that cavalry could still play a decisive role in battle in a modern war between equally equipped forces, and so cavalry units continued to be part of the armed forces of major European powers for the next half century.

The III Corps suffered 44 per cent of the German casualties and lost 6,955 officers, men and surgeons, including 1,863 killed, 4,889 wounded and 203 missing.