Royal Lao Armed Forces United States Air operations The Battle of Nam Bac was one of the major engagements of the Laotian Civil War.
Nam Bac itself could only be resupplied by air from Luang Prabang, and its supply line was dependent upon use of an airstrip sited on low ground within artillery range of nearby heights.
As the Royalist defense deteriorated, diversionary relief columns set out from both east and west of the besieged positions.
As the leaderless Royalist force dissolved, it suffered heavy casualties as the Vietnamese rounded up fleeing Lao soldiers.
In addition to uncounted small arms, they had left the communists seven howitzers, 49 recoilless rifles, 52 mortars, and copious ammunition.
[5][6] However, the CIA sponsored Auto Defense Choc militia training behind enemy lines, north of Nam Bac, in 1964.
CIA Station Chief Theodore Shackley claimed that the Army Attache and other members of the American Embassy were pushing for a reoccupation of the valley.
Shackley turned to his resident expert for advice; he asked Bill Lair's opinion of the proposed operation.
Although Nam Bac appeared upon the map to be an ideal spot to establish a position blocking a communist advance on Luang Prabang, it would have to be supplied by air in the absence of any roads.
Lair concluded by stating that he thought offering the Vietnamese a fixed base like Nam Bac to assault was a recipe for disaster.
On 18 July, Royal Lao Army troops were helilifted into the Nam Bac area, and found only light resistance.
The Royalist troops reclaimed the Nam Bac Valley in July and August 1966 in a move sanctioned by the American Embassy and supported by the CIA's proprietary airline, Air America.
On the 14th, RLA Bataillon d'Infanterie 26 (26th Infantry Battalion) was stationed 14 kilometres (8.7 mi) northeast of Nam; the North Vietnamese regulars attacked it and inflicted serious casualties.
On 31 August, 11 kilometres (6.8 mi) south of Nam Bac at a position at Mok Lok, RLA troops were accidentally bombed by Royal Lao Air Force Thai mercenary pilots.
The error caused the RLA to call off usage of the Thai mercenaries, leaving close air support to the understrength contingent of Lao RLAF pilots.
[6][8] Nevertheless, Air America still flew logistical support, including hauling in aerial rockets to be used as ground-to-ground weapons in lieu of artillery.
Bataillon Parachutistes 55 (Paratroop Battalion 55) was withdrawn from its action against opium smugglers crossing the Burmese/Lao border, loaded into landing craft, hauled down the Mekong River, and flown from Luang Prabang to Nam Bac via C-47 for the last leg of their journey.
However, the RLA irregulars briefly captured Nam Thuam, and managed to seize another air strip at Muang Xay, but could only hold it until 3 November.
On 15 November, some of General Vang Pao's guerrillas were airlifted closer to the siege and began marching westward in a relief column.
[8] In early December, before Vang Pao's Operation Linkup troops could arrive in Nam Bac, the North Vietnamese committed the entire battle-hardened PAVN 316th Division, along with part of the 335th Independent Regiment, to the battle.
A single communist 82mm mortar closed the Nam Bac airstrip with its shelling; Air America's C-123 Providers turned to parachuting supplies in to the garrison.
Bounchanh decided to move his threatened headquarters and its two supporting howitzers from a perilous location adjacent to the airstrip, to the nearby hilltop village of Ban Houei Ngat.
General Bounchanh believed the Nam Bac Valley had already fallen to the communists; he hastily fled southwards, to be plucked from the jungle via helicopter two days later.
The PAVN 316th Division now unleashed a weapon previously unknown in Laos, when they rained 122mm DKZ rockets on Groupement Mobile 15.
In artillery alone, they had lost seven howitzers, 49 recoilless rifles, 52 mortars, plus extensive stores of ammunition to the communists, who promptly moved their booty upriver.
[8] The Royalists scrambled to put up a new defense line north of Luang Prabang to protect the royal capitol, with little success.
A great deal of it was human, as most of the RLA troopers had been captured by an encircling maneuver by the 174th Regiment, rather than killed or wounded in combat.
Some 600 of these prisoners would switch sides rather than return to RLA combat service, and serve as porters and road builders for the communists.
The CIA officers on scene—Richard Secord, Tom Clines, Bill Lair, Pat Landry—believed their boss, Ted Shackley was responsible for the debacle.
Obviously, however, Sullivan had total command of the munitions and supplies needed to wage war in Laos, and did not use that veto power to prevent the Battle of Nam Bac.