The HVO, supported by Croatian Army artillery deployed north of the river, managed to withstand the offensive and the front line remained unchanged from the commencement of the battle.

In the final days of March, Bosnian Serb forces bombarded Bosanski Brod with artillery, resulting in a cross-border operation by the Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska – HV) 108th Brigade.

[9] A significant portion of the territory controlled by the VRS was located in western Bosnia, including the Bosnian Serb capital of Banja Luka.

After the capture of Derventa by the HVO and the HV in May 1992,[10] the VRS launched Operation Corridor 92 and regained control of the resupply route in late June.

By October, it had eliminated all HV or HVO-held pockets along the southern bank of the Sava and the border of Croatia, except a single bridgehead around the town of Orašje.

[13] While the HV and the HVO advanced west of Livno (Operation Leap 1),[14] the VRS launched its own offensive—Operation Joint Action 95 (Serbian: Operacija Sadejstvo 95).

Operation Joint Action 95 was intended as a war-winning offensive, and was launched south of the Derventa–Brčko corridor, but was also designed to widen the critical resupply route.

The shift of VRS focus to Orašje may have been the result of a desire to retaliate for the defeat suffered by the RSK in western Slavonia, or meant as a quick land-grab before a peace settlement was accepted.

TG-5, commanded by Colonel Dragoslav Đurkić, normally consisted of approximately 6,000 troops drawn from four infantry or light brigades, but for the offensive it received further 2,000 reinforcements.

[23] The primary axes of the attacks, directed at the centre and the east of the pocket and aiming towards Orašje and the village of Vidovice failed to gain ground.

[20] On that occasion, a combined armour and infantry assault broke through three lines of trenches,[21] with the assistance of strong artillery support including the bombardment of HVO positions with approximately 5,000 shells and two 9K52 Luna-M rockets.

[20] According to Bosnian Serb sources, the HV fired six rockets from its positions in the Posavski Podgajci and Rajevo Selo areas against targets in Brčko, causing substantial damage but no casualties.

The failure was despite the offensive being conducted competently, and applying VRS military doctrine calling for the use of armoured and assault infantry supported by artillery.

In consequence, the VRS was no longer capable of defeating its opposition by relying heavily on artillery superiority, and it was unwilling to commit its dwindling numbers of infantry to a decisive but risky attack.