In response to the impending military campaign of the Polish, the Ottoman Empire made a pre-emptive strike on the area of Commonwealth.

Near Podhajce 6000-strong Polish army under Field Crown Hetman Feliks Kazimierz Potocki repelled approximately 14,000 man Tatar expedition under Qaplan I Giray.

The empire, exhausted by the war and recent Janissaries riots and in fear of losing other territories, began to be willing to enter into peace negotiations.

Habsburg Monarchy in the fall of 1697 began negotiations with the Ottoman Empire proposing the end of war with each member of the Holy League keeping captured territories (Uti possidetis, ita possideatis).

During talks held in Rava-Ruska, Peter did not promise Augustus to support his campaign despite the king's request.

[14] In January 1698, Stambul's intelligence started to receive information about the king's preparations that were suspected to capture Kamianets.

[17] Potocki decided to concentrate Polish army in Podhajce because the terrain gave the defenders an advantage together with a castle.

On September 7, hearing news about an approaching Tatar army, sent message to Żaboklicki with order to set out to Podhajce.

After hearing news about the Tatar army nearby at Bobulińce, Żaboklicki gathered all units from Monasterzysk (with 12 light cannons) and on the early morning of September 8 set off to Podhajce with a separate front and rear guard ready to repel Tatars' attacks.

Due to accurate artillery fire, the Tatars were unable to successfully cross the river and defeat defenders.

Despite difficult fights, the Poles – with help of cannons, wagon fort and good terrain for defense – managed to repel Tatars.

Near Wierzbów, previously long Polish group (stretched up to c. 9 kilometers) created one big wagon fort and defended by it managed to reach Podhajce.

[22] During the night war council, Potocki decided to give battle to the Tatars outside the city, 2 kilometers towards the north.

The decision to fight in the field had three important reasons: an insufficient number of infantry for defensive combat, the majority of the army consisted of cavalry, and the fear of devastation of the city, which was owned by Potocki.

During early morning of September 9, main Tatars group moved to Monaster (2 km east of Litwinów).

Gazi's wing was also under cannon fire from the beginning and seeing results of left-wing fight, decided not to attack Poles.

Potocki suspected the Tartars trick and Polish troops for the next 2 days were on combat alert and did not pursue enemy.

[29] Polish and Saxon troops located near Lviv noticed increased Tatar activity and on 6 September set out at a slow pace in the direction of Podhajce through Brzeżany.

Senate Council made king assign 10,000 troops to block Kamianets for the duration of peace negotiations.

On 25 September Michał Potocki and drunken soldiers from his chorągiew went to the king's tent in Brzeżany and insulted the people present there.

He prepared the Saxon troops in battle formation and moved 1,000 steps to the Polish camp in order to temper the Poles.

The hetmans did not believe that king will strike the Polish army, but as a precaution, instead of entering into a general battle, it was decided to use Hit-and-run tactics.

Although unsuccessful, the Commonwealth campaign had political impact on Polish demands, contributing to obtaining Podolia with undestroyed Kamianets.