The defensive line some 22 kilometers in length was built by Poland already in 1929–33, as part of the strategic plan for securing the national border around the Central Industrial Region.

In 1936–37 two new bridges were built over the Vistula and the Chochułka rivers near Goczałkowice and Pszczyna for military transport, and the supply roads were paved with asphalt in late 1930s.

[5] The tactical mistake of the Polish command was the assumption that the attack of the German 5th Panzer Division would require the support of infantry to secure its rear.

Also, overmuch certainty after great successes of the previous day (especially fierce, few hours-long combat - with use of the "big bag" trap - near Brzeźce village) contributed to Polish defeat.

Because of their certainty, Polish commanders decided to make "the big bag trap" more shallow - which meant that it was less flexible, and Polish positions would be easier to crush if the defense was not successful (as it happened) - but on the other hand - if the defense was successful (which didn't happen since the unexpected direction and strength of the German main attack were deadly), the shallow "bag" would be more effective because the German attack would be stopped faster and with greater casualties for the enemy due to a greater concentration of firepower.

The defeat suffered at Pszczyna (which also caused a loss of a significant percent of divisional artillery) forced the Polish High Command to pull back the entire frontline, and cede the territory of Upper Silesia to the Germans.