Following a poorly coordinated artillery bombardment and an ineffectual South African air strike, ELNA and Zairean infantry attacked the bridge early on the morning on 10 November, but became trapped in the open while crossing an elevated roadway and shelled by the defenders' rockets.

[10] The trend towards global decolonisation during the late 1940s and 1950s delivered an unprecedented boost to nationalist confidence and ambitions, and in January 1961 the Angolan War of Independence broke out when radicalised peasants launched the Baixa de Cassanje revolt.

[11] Between 1961 and 1964, three major nationalist movements rose to prominence in the fighting between the Portuguese security forces and local anti-colonial militants supported to varying degrees by the Soviet Union, China, and several newly independent African states.

[21] Angolan nationalists perceived the political upheaval in Lisbon as an opportunity to upend the colonial order; the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA rejected ceasefire requests and demanded the Portuguese affirm an unconditional right to independence.

[22] General António de Spínola, head of the Portuguese provisional government, was initially in favour of retaining the colonies as semi-autonomous federal subjects, but found little support for this measure in the progressive atmosphere which dominated after the revolution.

[24] By November 1974 the authority and morale of the Portuguese security forces in Angola had been seriously undermined; meanwhile, the three nationalist movements were attempting to exploit the developing power vacuum by amassing troops and stockpiling arms.

[28] On 3 January 1975, at the behest of Organisation of African Unity, Neto, Roberto, and UNITA's Savimbi signed an accord in which they agreed to a permanent truce and promised to terminate mutually hostile propaganda.

[33] The Portuguese succeeded in imposing a ceasefire on 7 June, but this was short-lived: the ELNA units stationed in Luanda had been sapped by the fighting in late May and the FAPLA general staff, detecting weakness, was eager to finish them off.

[40] On 9 July, FAPLA and the MPLA's popular militia resumed their counteroffensive, bringing the full weight of their Soviet-supplied weapons, including mortars and T-34-85 tanks, to bear against the lightly armed ELNA infantry.

[44] ELNA procurement agents turned to Zaire and the United States with requests for more arms, which they needed to counterbalance Soviet and Cuban aid to FAPLA and shift the military balance back in Roberto's favour.

[45] The CIA agreed to send fourteen million dollars' worth of materiel collectively to ELNA and FALA, including trucks, radio equipment, small arms, and anti-tank weapons.

[48] South Africa's decision to throw aid behind ELNA and FALA marked the first definitive step toward its own deep embroilment in the Angolan war, the beginning of a series of escalations which would lead to the commitment of regular ground forces on 23 October.

[44] The increased flow of foreign material and financial aid beginning in August had done little to improve this situation due to logistics woes and corruption in the Zairean Armed Forces, which had diverted the most modern CIA-supplied weapons bound for ELNA to its own arsenals.

[25] Like their ELNA counterparts, the FAPLA fighters were mostly inexperienced; they were drawn from the ranks of Luanda's unemployed working class, political activists, and trade unionists, and possessed little instinct in military fieldcraft.

[93] Russian historians Vladimir and Gennady Shubin later identified this officer as Colonel Yuri Mitin, but asserted that he did not arrive in Angola until 16 November, along with the rest of the Soviet military group.

[1] Its defence had assumed increasing importance in FAPLA command circles early in the fighting, when damage to the Dondo hydroelectric complex to the east made the capital even more dependent on the Quifangondo waterworks.

[6] South Africa's subsequent delivery of three medium guns and promises of air support, via a squadron of English Electric Canberra bombers, encouraged Roberto to launch his final assault, which was scheduled for 10 November.

[73] Spikes commented that "for weeks, South African and American advisers to the FNLA had counseled Roberto to follow the same strategy as Savimbi – that at all costs he...retain his territory and not launch an offensive against Luanda.

[116] This option had already been discussed between Roberto and his South African advisers and rejected for several reasons: the swampy terrain east of the highway was impassable to the wheeled vehicles, possessed inadequate cover to bestow an advantage in concealment, and the ELNA infantry had flatly refused to cross it on foot, citing the hazard posed by crocodiles and venomous snakes.

[29] Roos and Bosch observed that the morning's artillery bombardment and the follow-up strike by the Canberras had at least achieved the desirable psychological effect: they noticed the FAPLA troops on the other side of the Bengo River moving to the rear.

[74] Spikes writes that while on previous forays, ELNA "had advanced cautiously; [on November 10], however, confident they faced an enemy already broken by...constant bombardment, Roberto's army swept down from Morro de Cal, squeezed onto the road and sped forward.

[123] The ELNA column was soon within range of the artillery battery of the FAPLA 9th Brigade, but the defenders were under strict orders to hold their fire until the entire attacking force was enclosed within a predetermined kill zone between the lagoon and the shoreline from east to west,[116] or when the vehicles had reached the section of elevated highway over Panguila Lake.

[6] Monteiro "Ngongo" had positioned his six Grad-P rocket launchers over the crest of a hill to protect them from South African and Zairean counter-battery action, but he and a second officer were posted within view of the highway to direct their fire.

[124] Both the ZiS-3 and armoured car crews were forced to make estimations and corrections with primitive sighting equipment, resulting in a tense exchange of fire at extremely close range before the AMLs were finally knocked out.

[4] Attempts to reconstitute the assault group at the farm were severely hampered by two salvoes of enemy rocket fire which struck the site and inflicted heavy casualties on the ELNA troops massing for a second attack.

[74] The South African artillery crews worked frantically through the night to extricate the guns, reaching the Dondo River amid a backwash of wounded and demoralised stragglers from broken ELNA units.

[129] In the words of South African historian Willem Steenkamp, "the Cubans and FAPLA missed a marvelous opportunity to deal the FNLA a major knockout blow: a reasonably strong mechanised force could have taken full advantage of the general confusion and panic to thrust all the way to Ambriz.

[135] Brigadier Roos gave Roberto some parting advice on fighting delaying actions and arranged to have his logistics staff and artillery crews evacuated from Ambriz by a South African Navy frigate, the SAS President Steyn.

[143] Stockwell caustically wrote of the undisciplined Zairean withdrawal: "Mobutu's finest...vented their frustration on the villages and towns in the path of their flight, in a tidal wave of terrorism, rape, and pillage, until the Kongo tribesmen of northern Angola prayed for the early arrival of the MPLA and Cuban liberators.

"[141] Continued logistical woes further undermined Roberto's efforts to fight a defensive campaign; with the loss of Ambriz, the remaining ELNA forces were dependent on rations flown by chartered aircraft to two airstrips near the Zairean border, and these often failed to reach the front in time.