In August, insurgents executed a tribal sheik who was encouraging his kinsmen to join the Iraqi police and prevented his body from being buried in accordance with Islamic laws.

In September 2006, Sheik Abdul Sattar Abu Risha formed the Anbar Salvation Council, an alliance of approximately 40 Sunni tribes.

2-28 ID conducted battalion-sized sweeps of neighborhoods, killing hundreds of enemy fighters, but the areas would be quickly reoccupied by AQI after the 2-28ID returned to its forward operating bases.

But the U.S. commander of 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division, Colonel Sean MacFarland decided to take it slowly and softly, without using heavy close air support, artillery or tank fire.

On June 7, through intelligence tracking, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi was located and killed by US Forces in a precision-guided bomb strike outside of Baghdad along with five other insurgents.

[10] At the beginning of July, units under the command of 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division and Iraqi Forces, managed to push deep enough into the city to capture the Ramadi General Hospital.

The Marines reported through verified evidence that members of al-Qaeda in Iraq had been using the seven-story building, which was equipped with some 250 beds, to treat their wounded and fire on U.S. troops in the area.

[13] On August 21, insurgents killed Abu Ali Jassim, a Sunni sheikh who had encouraged many of his tribesmen to join the Iraqi Police.

The insurgents hid the body in a field rather than returning it for a proper burial, violating Islamic law and angering Jassim's tribesmen.

[27] A Marine spokesman disputed the account, saying that an airstrike on November 14 targeted a bridge east of Ramadi and there were many insurgent casualties in the attack.

He said that on the 13th and 14th, Coalition forces killed 16 suspected insurgents, who had been placing IEDs and firing mortars and RPGs, in fighting in three separate incidents in Ramadi.

[30] The intense battles of October and November 2006 largely eliminated al-Qaeda from the city, the surviving militants fled, with teams of them turning up in Baghdad and elsewhere, whilst others melted into the population.

[31] Two years before the battle, in 2004, then commander of the Marine garrison, MajGen James Mattis, stated that, "if Ramadi fell the whole province (Al Anbar) goes to hell".

[32] Two years later, a classified report written by Marine Col. Pete Devlin in August 2006 and leaked to the Washington Post in mid-September 2006, said Al Anbar had been lost and there was almost nothing that could be done.

[33][34] On November 28, 2006, another part of the classified Marine Corps intelligence report was published by The Washington Post which said US forces could neither crush the insurgency in western Iraq nor counter the rising popularity of the al-Qaeda terrorist network in the area.

According to the report, "the social and political situation has deteriorated to a point that US and Iraqi troops are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar."

The report describes al-Qaeda in Iraq as the "dominant organization of influence" in the province, more important than local authorities, the Iraqi government and US troops "in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni.

Three of these, two soldiers and a Marine, were killed in an area of western Ramadi controlled by the Abu Alwan tribe, which was aligned with the Awakening movement.

The operation began February 20, 2007, when tanks and IFVs from 3-69th Armor and 1-26th Infantry set up a full cordon around Mal'ab District, preventing any movement in or out of the neighborhood.

Once this was in place, the soldiers of the 1st and 9th Infantry Regiments began conducting clearing operations and targeted raids searching for weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), enemy fighters, and high-level al-Qaedah leadership within Mal'ab District and the neighboring Iskaan district, supported by the aforementioned armored vehicles, Apache helicopters, and long range rockets (GMLRS).

Coupled with further gains in recruiting the local leaders and militias in the surrounding areas, Anbar Province required very little assistance during the famous "surge" that took place later in 2007.

The improvement was so great that it enabled Task Force 1-9 (now operating without the armored and mechanized support it had enjoyed in the early part of 2007) to send nearly 70% of its strength to assist other units in clearing the city of Taji, just north of Baghdad, in October 2007.

By August 2007, Ramadi had gone 80 consecutive days without a single attack on US forces and the 1st BDE, 3rd ID commander, Colonel John Charlton, stated, "...al-Qaeda is defeated in Al Anbar".

On June 30, 2007, a group of between 50 and 60 insurgents attempting to infiltrate Ramadi were intercepted and destroyed, following a tip from Iraqi Police officers.

As part of the Tribal Engagement Strategy, Ready First developed and implemented a plan to quickly recruit, train, and employ Iraqi policemen on the streets of Ramadi.

COL MacFarland, and LTC James Lechner, Deputy Brigade Commander, successfully developed an Iraqi Police recruiting, training, and employment plan that was implemented by HHC, 2-152 Infantry (Mech), an Army National Guard unit that lived in Iraqi police stations and Combat Outposts conducting daily patrols and clearing operations with their counterparts.