"[7] These supplies and replacements were not enough to sustain Japanese troops on the island, who by 7 December 1942, were losing about 50 men each day from malnutrition, disease, and Allied ground or air attacks.

Despite initial opposition from Army leaders, who still hoped that Guadalcanal could eventually be retaken from the Allies, on 31 December 1942 the Imperial General Headquarters, with approval from the Emperor, agreed to evacuate all Japanese forces from the island and establish a new line of defense for the Solomons on New Georgia.

[10] An important element in the plan was an air superiority campaign starting 28 January 1943, to inhibit Allied aircraft or warships from disrupting the final stage of the Ke operation, which was the actual evacuation of all Japanese troops from Guadalcanal.

[12] At the same time, Admiral William Halsey Jr., the Allied theatre commander, was under pressure from his superiors to complete the replacement of the 2nd Marine Regiment, which had been in combat on Guadalcanal since August, with fresh U.S. Army troops.

[16] Ahead of the troop convoy, between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal, was Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen's Task Force 18 (TF 18), a close support group of heavy cruisers USS Wichita, Chicago, and Louisville, light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, and Columbia; escort carriers Chenango and Suwannee; and eight destroyers.

[18] Also, Chicago had just arrived back in the South Pacific, after completing repairs from damage suffered during the Battle of Savo Island almost six months before.

[19] Wary of the threat from Japanese submarines, which Allied intelligence indicated were likely in the area, Giffen arranged his cruisers and destroyers for anti-submarine defense, not expecting an air attack.

[22] The radar contacts were the approaching Japanese torpedo bombers, who circled around to the south of TF 18 so that they could attack from the east, with the black backdrop of the eastern sky behind them.

From this direction, the Japanese bombers were hidden by the night sky, but Giffen's ships were silhouetted against the twilight of the western horizon.

Meanwhile, a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft began dropping flares and floatlights to mark the course and speed of TF 18 for the impending attack by Hagai's bombers.

[23][25] In pitch darkness, Louisville managed to take the crippled Chicago under tow and slowly headed south, away from the battle area, escorted by the rest of TF 18.

At 12:15, Lieutenant Commander Kazuo Nishioka led a force of 11 G4M torpedo bombers from the 751 Air Group (Kanoya Kōkūtai), based at Kavieng and staging through Buka, New Guinea, launched to attack the damaged U.S. cruiser.

[29] One torpedo hit the destroyer USS La Vallette in her forward engine room, killing 22 of her crew and causing heavy damage.

[34] The defeat and resulting recriminations did not affect Giffen's career; he continued to lead Allied battleship and cruiser task forces in the Pacific until 1944 and was later promoted to vice admiral.

[35] With Japanese aircraft engaged with TF 18, the Allied transports completed their mission of replacing the remaining marines on Guadalcanal over the last two days in January 1943.

Because the Allies believed that the Japanese were not evacuating, but actually sending in more reinforcements, U.S. destroyers and troop transports were proceeding with normal amphibious operations in western Guadalcanal despite losing the heavy firepower of TF 18.

[36][37] The Allies were not aware of the Japanese withdrawal until it was over,[10] but the evacuation of 11,000 starving troops and the loss of one cruiser became a footnote to the securing of Henderson Field and Guadalcanal, which provided the air support springboard to successfully complete the Solomon Islands campaign, a major turning point in the Pacific War.