[4] After the Battle of Shaho, the Russian and Japanese forces faced each other south of Mukden until the frozen Manchurian winter began.

The Japanese field commanders thought no major battle was possible and assumed that the Russians had the same view regarding the difficulty of winter combat.

Gripenberg was initially pessimistic towards Kuropatkin's plans for an offensive against the Japanese left wing, which was in an exposed northern position close to Russian territory near the small village of Heikoutai.

Departing on 8 January, Mishchenko made unexpectedly slow progress due to inclement weather and the lack of forage and supplies along the way.

[6] On 25 January 1905, the battle began with an attack by the 1st Siberian Rifle Corps on the fortified village of Heikoutai, which the Russians took with severe losses.

By the morning of 28 January, Gripenberg found that he was separated from Kaulbars by the village of Sandepu, which prevented any attempt to link forces.

Simultaneously, the Russian 10th Army Corps under General Konstantin Tserpitsky, with Gripenberg's consent, succeeded in securing positions to the rear of Sandepu.

Advancing Russian soldiers, their morale high as they were on what appeared to be a successful offense for the first time since the beginning of the war, could not understand the reason.

In Russia, the Marxists used the newspaper controversy created by Gripenberg, and by Kuropatkin’s incompetence in previous battles, to drum up more support in their campaign against the government.