[3] On 6 October, however, another revolution broke out in Vienna, which also claimed the life of Jelačić's main advisor, the Austrian Minister of War Theodor Franz, Count Baillet von Latour.

[3] By mid-October, the whole of Transdanubia was back in Hungarian hands, and the most important forts and fortresses in the western part of the country, Komárom, Lipótvár and Eszék, were secured.

On receiving the news of the Vienna revolution, the government commissioner of the Hungarian army in Győr, László Csány, commented: "God grant that it may be true.

[7] In Vienna, however, neither the Imperial Assembly nor its committee, nor even the city council, were willing to formally ask for help, although most of their members privately approved the Hungarian army's entry.

[8] On 6 and 7 October the rest of Móga's army arrived in Győr, and on the 8th the advance guard, reinforced by eight companies of hussars, reached Parndorf, from where the next day it began to pursue the enemy towards Bruck an der Leitha, killing some Croatian soldiers and taking about 300 prisoners.

[8] Several people spoke in favor of the continuation of the pursuit, but the majority had the opinion that the border crossing should not be carried out unless the Austrian legislature specifically requested the Hungarian government to send the army to their aid.

On the afternoon of 17 October, Móga, upon the order of the political leadership, sent the outposts, commanded by newly arrived Colonel Artúr Görgei, forward over the Lajta river.

[8] However, after the Austrian provincial assembly had a reluctant stance about the offer of the Hungarian House of Representatives, Kossuth ordered Móga to abandon any offensive actions and to confine himself to the defense of the borders.

[9] Kossuth, in order to put an end to the instability and uncertainty in the camp from Parndorf, on 17 October, set out from the capital with a squadron of Wilhelm Hussars, additional units of the 25th Honvéd battalion, 1,500 national guards from Pest, and 3 artillery batteries on boats towards Móga's camp; in the meantime, he was joined by national guards everywhere, so that by the time he reached Miklósfalva on 23 October, the relief troops he had brought with him had been increased to 12,000 men.

[10] After his arrival, Kossuth held a council of war with the officers present to receive him, and in his introductory speech he spoke enthusiastically in favor of resuming the offensive operations in order to relieve Vienna.

Móga and his chief of staff, Colonel Josef Kollmann, opposed the idea of a new border crossing, citing the enemy's superior strength and the lack of training of the Hungarian troops.

But he added, that if there is an officer who says that, even if a victory could not be achieved, but at least the army could be saved, he is ready to hand over to him the command and give the order to attack the Austrians.

Then, pointing out that the Hungarians had defeated Jelačić at Pákozd and captured Roth's corps at Ozora, he asked Windisch-Grätz to cease hostilities, end the siege of Vienna and to ensure the unity of the empire by peace.

[10] The statement of Windisch-Grätz and the capture of Ivánka aroused vehement indignation in the Hungarian camp, and if some of the officers had hitherto agreed with some reserve to the idea of marching Austrian territory, now a sense of revenge arose in all of them so that even those who were hesitant, were now in favor of launching the attack as soon as possible.

[12] On 28 October, the same day on which the Hungarians crossed the Lajta for the third time, Windisch-Grätz made his first heavy attack on Vienna; and it softened the Viennese defense that they were willing to negotiate with the besiegers.

[10] So for the time being, both the center and the Hungarian right wing were doing well enough, only the Répássy column, which was advancing too cautiously on the Rauchenwarth-Schwechat road, could not get on a level with them and join the battle.

[16] The idle waiting in front of Schwechat was only good for giving the enemy time and opportunity for a concentrated fire attack against the Hungarian troops on the open field.

[10] Görgei positioned his four battalions in the shape of a pick (hook) to defend against the encirclement; his cavalry was ordered to cover the half-battery left at the disposal of his brigade.

[20] Major Pusztelnik, realizing the danger posed by this, also deployed several batteries against Schwechat, but they were soon overwhelmed by the more intense fire of the enemy and forced to abandon their positions.

[21] Exploiting this advantage, the enemy batteries moved to the hills east of Schwechat and immediately started firing first against the Hungarian center and then against the right flank column.

[10] As a result of the cannon fire, the Gömör and Hont volunteer mobile National Guard battalions forming Görgei's left flank wavered and then started to run away.

[20] Görgei then galloped to the 1st Pest Volunteer Mobile National Guard Battalion, because he believed that with them he could still attempt a charge against the imperial batteries which advanced a little bit too forward.

army encircled and pushed back the left flank, which, because of Répásy's delaying, was formed by Görgei's brigade, Móga sent orders to the troops in the center to retreat.

[22] Meanwhile, the gunners limbered (i.e. attach the gun to the two-wheeled "locomotive" used to change position), retreated, then stopped at a short distance and fired at the advancing enemy.

Jelačić's plan was to take the cavalry division led by Lieutenant General Franz Liechtenstein and attack the rear of the Hungarian troops who were pinned down on the Schwechat line.

[24] At the time of the campaign to relieve Vienna, it was already known that on 21 October, Lieutenant-General Balthasar von Simunich, with a strong brigade of 5,000 men, had entered Trencsén County from Moravia through the Jablunka Pass.

[25] After the Battle of Schwechat, Kossuth arranged for 8,000 troops, commanded by Colonel Richard Guyon, to enter Köpcsény with 22 guns to capture Simunich's army.

[26] The Battle of Schwechat proved that temporarily mobilized national guards and popular insurgents, militias, and untrained volunteers, are not enough to defeat the enemy's regular forces.

[27] The relief of Vienna from the imperial siege was an illusory ambition at that time: Schwechat did not turn into a military disaster, as the conduct of some of the troops and the enemy's mistakes allowed the Hungarian army to reach the Lajta river relatively intact.

[28] From a politico-military point of view, the campaign was a success for the Hungarians, since it was the beginning of a purification process that put into leading positions the officers who were committed to the defense of Hungary against any enemy.