The British took 38,300 prisoners for a loss of 624 men and continued the five-day raid on Italian positions in Egypt, eventually capturing Cyrenaica and most of the 10th Army between Sollum and at the Battle of Beda Fomm, south of the port of Benghazi.

[1] In the late 30s, Italian divisions had been cut from three regiments each to two for increased mobility once they were mechanised; reservists were recalled in 1939, along with the usual call-up of conscripts.

[3] The HQ of the 6th Infantry Division, which lacked complete and fully trained units, was renamed the Western Desert Force (WDF) on 17 June.

The Regio Esercito and Regia Aeronautica in Libya greatly outnumbered the British in Egypt but suffered from poor morale and were handicapped by some inferior equipment.

In 1939, Wavell began to plan a base in the Middle East for about fifteen divisions (300,000 men), six in Egypt, three in Palestine and the rest further afield.

[10] The war was fought primarily in the Western Desert, which was about 240 mi (386 km) wide, from Mersa Matruh in Egypt to Gazala on the Libyan coast, along the Via Balbia, the only paved road.

[11] Scorpions, vipers and flies populated the region, which was inhabited by a small number of Bedouin nomads, whose tracks linked wells (birs) and the easier traversed ground.

[12] Navigation was reliant on the sun, stars, compass bearings and "desert sense", good perception of the environment gained by experience.

When Italian troops advanced into Egypt in September 1940, the Maletti Group got lost leaving Sidi Omar and had to be found by reconnaissance aircraft.

[13] the Sirocco (Gibleh/Ghibli), a hot desert wind, blows clouds of fine sand, which reduces visibility to a few metres and coats eyes, lungs, machinery, food and equipment; motor vehicles and aircraft need special oil filters and the barren ground means that supplies for military operations have to be transported from outside.

The British crossed into Libya that night, exchanged fire with Italian troops at Sidi Omar and discovered that some of them were unaware that war had been declared.

Two days later, the British raided a convoy on the Tobruk–Bardia road, killed 21 Italian troops and took 88 prisoners, including Generale di Brigata Romolo Lastrucci, the 10th Army Chief Engineer.

[19] On 13 September 1940, the invasion began as a limited tactical operation towards Matruh, rather than the strategic objectives sketched in Rome, due to the chronic lack of transport, fuel and wireless equipment, even with transfers from the 5th Army.

An Italian force of fifty tanks attempted a flanking move, which led the British rearguard to retire east of Sidi Barrani.

British road demolitions were repaired, wells cleaned and work commenced on a water pipe-line from the frontier, to accumulate supplies for the resumption of the advance in mid-December.

[26] To obtain a measure of air superiority, eleven Vickers Wellington bombers from Malta attacked Castel Benito on 7 December and destroyed 29 aircraft on the ground.

Next day, three fighter squadrons patrolled the British concentration areas and during the night, 29 Wellingtons and Blenheims bombed Benina and damaged ten aircraft.

The force put a dummy tank brigade in the desert as a decoy for Italian aircraft and by dawn on 9 December, was just short of Maktila.

[27] In December 1940 the 10th Army in Egypt had been reinforced to about nine Binary, Blackshirt and colonial divisions east of the frontier and had begun unit reliefs, which made it harder for the British to establish the Italian order of battle.

Division "3 Gennaio" (General Merzari) in reserve, about 12 mi (19 km) away at Sidi Barrani, with Gallina and the Libyan Corps headquarters.

[33] Selby Force guarded the eastern approaches to Sidi Barrani, as the rest of the WDF attacked the fortified camps further inland.

Late on 9 December, O'Connor and Beresford-Pierce sent the 16th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Cyril Lomax) from reserve to cut the roads into Sidi Barrani, two field artillery regiments supported the advance and the 7th RTR rushed to get unserviceable tanks back into action.

[36] The moves forward on 10 December were confused by uncertainty over Italian dispositions, bitter cold and a dust storm which reduced visibility to 50 yd (46 m).

The last ten Matildas moved up on the left and drove into the western face of the Sidi Barrani defences, south of the main road, then disappeared into the sandstorm.

[36] The attack became a mêlée and at 10:00 a.m. when the 16th Brigade began to advance, about 2,000 Blackshirts rose up, apparently ready to counter-attack; they had lost heart and surrendered instead.

[38] Selby Force had followed up the retreat of the 1st Libyan Division as it moved the 15 mi (24 km) from Maktila to Sidi Barrani and drove part of the column into sand dunes north of the coast road.

Large numbers of men and guns were captured and a patrol from the 7th Support Group entered Rabia to find it empty, as the 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" had withdrawn from there and Sofafi overnight.

Fort Capuzzo, 40 mi (64 km) inland at the end of the frontier wire, was captured en passant by 7th Armoured Division, as it advanced westwards to Bardia.