Following the Smolensk encirclement, much of Army Group Centre became mired in positional warfare, suffering significant losses in defensive battles throughout the late summer of 1941.

[16] These factors seriously depleted the offensive strength of the German divisions, and contributed to the disastrous setbacks later suffered in the Battle of Moscow in December 1941.

[17] After their initial defeats, the Red Army began to recover and took measures to ensure a more determined resistance and new defensive line was established around Smolensk.

The result was a disaster, as the offensive ran directly into the anti-tank defenses of the German 7th Panzer Division and the two Soviet mechanized corps were virtually wiped out.

Guderian expected that the offensive would continue towards Moscow as its main focus and sent the 10th Panzer Division to the Desna River to establish a bridgehead on the east bank at Yelnya and cleared that as well by the 20th.

Under Fuhrer Directive 33 issued on 14 July, the main effort of the Wehrmacht was re-orientated away from Moscow towards a deep encirclement of Kiev in Ukraine and Bock was becoming impatient, wanting Guderian to strike north and link up with Hoth's Panzer Group so resistance in the city could be mopped up.

[23][24] On 27 July, Bock held a conference at Novy Borisov, which was also attended by Commander-in-Chief Walther von Brauchitsch, the head of the OKH, the High Command of the Army.

The generals were required to sit without an opportunity to comment, while a memorandum was read to them by one of Brauchitsch's aides, instructing them that they were to strictly follow Fuhrer Directive 33 and were under no circumstance to try to push further east.

They were ordered to concentrate on mopping up, refurbishing equipment, restocking supplies and straightening the German front line, which had become more of an "S" shape, due to the advances of Guderian and Hoth.

After returning to his post, Guderian conspired with Hoth and Bock to "delay the implementation" of Directive 33, in defiance of the orders of the Fuhrer and OKH.

Timoshenko put newly promoted Konstantin Rokossovsky, who had just arrived from the Ukrainian front, in charge of assembling a stopgap force, which held the attack of the 7th Panzer Division and with continuous reinforcements, temporarily stabilized the situation.

These newly built formations would, immediately upon arrival, start a heavy counter-attack against the German forces around the Smolensk area from 21 July on.

However, poor coordination and logistics on the part of the Soviets allowed the Germans to successfully defend against these offensive efforts, while continuing to close the encirclement.

The battle resulted in significant casualties on both sides, but the Soviets viewed their ability to regroup and launch counteroffensives as a strategic success.

From the German perspective, the battle demonstrated their ability to conduct large-scale encirclement operations, capturing significant numbers of Soviet troops and matériel.

The time and resources consumed at Smolensk delayed the German advance towards Moscow, contributing to the eventual failure to capture the Soviet capital before the onset of winter.

The second offensive, from 29 August to 12 September, was marked by a renewed Soviet effort to regain lost territory and stabilize the front line.

The Red Army's persistence in the face of adversity played a crucial role in halting the German advance and buying time for the Soviet Union to mobilize its vast resources for the defense of Moscow and other key areas.

First reason for this discovery may be in that the Soviet regimental, company, and personal documents of soldiers are not usually examined, and the small unit losses would be extrapolated from divisional level, at best.

On the part of the Germans, opinions were divided: von Bock believed that the battle was over, and after rest and replenishment, the troops of Army Group Center could continue their successful offensive against Moscow.

On the other hand, Guderian's victory at Roslavl, on the right flank of Army Group Center, opened up the possibility of an attack to the south and a gigantic encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev.

However, neither Bock nor Hitler planned an immediate offensive directly on Moscow, and the need to constantly repel Soviet strikes exhausted the troops.

We needed every man forward… In spite of huge losses… the enemy attacked daily in several sectors so that, up to this time, it has not been possible to regroup forces and bring up reserves.

"[citation needed] Thus, in the next month after the elimination of the "cauldron" near Smolensk, von Bock's armies defended themselves in the center and attacked with limited forces on the flanks.

In the south, Guderian won the battles near Gomel and Krichev, and in the north, Group Stumme captured Velikiye Luki and advanced further to the east to Andreapol.

[46] During the battle, the German army captured the Archives of Smolensk Oblast Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a large amount of documents about local history from 1917 to 1941.

The leaders of the General Staff, Franz Halder and Brauchitsch and commanders like Bock, Hoth and Guderian counselled against dispersing the German armoured units and to concentrate on Moscow.