corps, and the main Hungarian armies could advance towards the Hungarian capitals (Buda and Pest), forcing the Austrian high commander, Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz fight a decisive battle at Isaszeg, which would decide the fate of Central and Western Hungary until the intervention of the Russian forces on the Habsburg side in June 1849.

Although this victory was not very important, its psychological significance for the Hungarian soldiers, was enormous, facilitating also the success of the plan of the campaign, because of the commander of the III.

[5] The Hungarian plan for the Spring Campaign, as elaborated by Antal Vetter, was that VII Corps, commanded by András Gáspár, had to attract the attention of the Austrian Windisch-Grätz by making a feint attack from the direction of Hatvan.

[8] On 2 April, Field Marshal Windisch-Grätz ordered Lieutenant General Anton Csorich to march with his division from Vác to Gödöllő, and join with Schlik's III.

[8] Jelačić's I. corps, which had the duty to transport away the valuable goods from Szolnok, and to march to Alberti, did not carry out Windisch-Grätz's order because he did not finish the transfer of the salt stock yet.

[10] This order was especially hard to be fulfilled for the Rastić brigade, which on that day already made a march from Abony to Cegléd, and now, during the night, he had to move to Alberti, then, only after two hours resting, at 4:00 p.m., they had to continue their way to Kóka, to join with the bulk of the I. first corps.

According to Görgei's orders regarding the troops' movements for 4 April, Klapka's I. corps had to march from Jászberény, through Nagykáta, towards Tápióbicske at 4:00 a.m., Damjanich's III.

So, without thinking about the danger of revealing the campaign plan to the enemy, Klapka decided to fall on them by surprise and take this, apparently, easy booty.

[12] Here, after leaving the Croatian banderial hussars in Tápióbicske, colonel Sternberg made a with the rest of the cavalry (8 companies) reconnaissance towards Nagykáta, and finding nothing suspicious in the area which stretched until the Tápió river, he gave to his brigade a longer break to feed their horses.

The latter quickly ordered his troops to prepare for the battle, but to win them some time for this, he sent the 6 companies of Croatian banderial hussars in attack, then deployed his 6-pounder battery, under the protection of the Ogulin-Slunj border guard battalion, on a hill which laid 1000 paces northwest from the village.

[12] Meanwhile, the Dipold brigade repulsed the attack of the Banderial Hussars, which retreated behind the village, then entered Tápióbicske, which they thought unoccupied by the enemy,[12] in tight company columns.

[5] But here they were caught by surprise by the crossfire[17] (or a bayonet charge) of two Otočac battalions, hidden among and in the houses of the village and suffered heavy losses.

[17] The soldiers of the fleeing Dipold-brigade ran into the Bobich-brigade which had just crossed the river and deployed its horse battery, causing disorder and panic among them.

[16] The Hungarians also lost an entire battery because the gunners were confused by the attacking enemy infantry with theirs, due to them having the same color uniforms.

[19] This was due to the poor quality of their training, or the short period of their instruction, caused by the urgent need for new troops to replace losses and the pressures of defending a country attacked from every direction, and the unpreparedness and lack of training of the officers; all of these down to the fact that the Hungarian army was only a few months old, while its enemy, the Habsburg army was the product of many centuries of uninterrupted institutional tradition.

Riedesel challenged Sebő to a duel, and this he accepted, despite fearing that he would certainly be killed, as he said later, to set a courageous example for his regiment, which was known as one of the weakest in the Hungarian army.

[23] Görgei ordered the Wysocki division to attack the bridge and take it back from the enemy, sending also the soldiers of the, earlier fleeing, but now regrouped I. corps, to support them.

[12] First the "Red Hatted" battalion attacked the bridge, but they jammed up on the narrow path, being caught in a harsh enemy fusillade, losing many soldiers, causing them to retreat.

Before they arrived there, they met the "Red Hatted" Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel Pál Kiss, which meanwhile regrouped, and were preparing to attack again the bridge.

[12] Then the two battalions attacked together the enemy positioned in front of the bridge, shooting at them, and pushing them back, establishing a foothold on the other bank of the Tápió.

[12] The 3. and the 9. battalions were followed by the rest of the Wysocki division, as well as the soldiers of the I. corps, wiping in this way the stain off their honor, for their shameful retreat at the start of the battle.

[12] Rastić stopped with a portion of his troops on the heights west of Tápióbicske, in order to secure the retreat of the bulk of his army towards Tápióság.

[12] Additionally, György Klapka, normally a very capable general, had made a considerable tactical error in giving the order to attack Tápióbicske, because in doing so he had revealed the location of his troops.

[24] Róbert Hermann believes that although Görgei was uncertain what to do, he finally decided to order his troops to continue their movements according to the initial plan.

This misled Windisch-Grätz, who did not understand what was happening on the south-eastern front, and contributed to him ordering the Ban of Croatia (Jelačić) to pursue the Hungarians, who in reality were not fleeing but nearing Gödöllő.

Windisch-Grätz's error reduced his chance of victory against the Hungarian main forces in the Battle of Isaszeg which followed two days after Tápióbicske.

[25] The correspondence, on 4–5 April between Windisch-Grätz and Jelačić, shows that they both were uncertain about where is the Hungarian main force, and from which direction will attack, which underlines the fact that the failure of the Ban of Croatia to communicate the real outcome of the battle, as well the hesitating character of Windisch-Grätz, undone Klapa's errors made in the Battle of Tápióbicske, making possible one of the most important purposes of the Hungarian campaign: encircling and crushing the Austrian main army in front of Budapest, or to push them towards Vác, preventing them to retreat through the capital city, to remain still achievable.

Leiningen replied that the fight for the bridge will decide the argument between the two: the one who will be the braver and the more effective in driving the Austrian soldiers away, will win their duel.