Battle of Tannenberg Line

1942 1943 1944 The Battle of Tannenberg Line (German: Die Schlacht um die Tannenbergstellung; Russian: Битва за линию «Танненберг») or the Battle of the Blue Hills (Estonian: Sinimägede lahing) was a military engagement between the German Army Detachment Narwa and the Soviet Leningrad Front.

The strategic aim of the Soviet Estonian Operation was to reoccupy Estonia as a favorable base for the invasions of Finland and East Prussia.

As the Soviet forces were constantly reinforced, their overall casualties are estimated by Estonian historian Mart Laar to be 170,000 dead and wounded.

After defending the Narva bridgehead for six months, the German forces fell back to the Tannenberg Line in the hills of Sinimäed (Russian: Синие горы) on 26 July 1944.

The formations of Gruppenführer Felix Steiner's III SS Panzer Corps halted their withdrawal and moved into defensive positions on the hills.

Another front section manned by the East Prussians of the 11th Infantry Division was situated a few kilometres further south, against the 8th Army in the Krivasoo bridgehead.

[5] The Soviet Marshal Leonid Govorov considered the Tannenberg Line as the key position of Army Group North and concentrated the best forces of the Leningrad Front.

[5] The goal set by the War Council of the 2nd Shock Army was to break through the defense line of the III SS Panzer Corps at the Orphanage Hill, force their way to the town of Jõhvi in the west and reach the Kunda river by 1 August.

[4] To accomplish this, Govorov was ordered to destroy communications behind the German forces and conduct air assaults on the railway stations of Jõhvi and Tapa on 26 July.

The commander of the Army Detachment "Narwa", General der Infanterie Anton Grasser, assessed the German capacity as insufficient against the Soviet attack.

While sufficient in ammunition and machine-guns, the combat morale of the Germanic volunteers was under heavy pressure while the spirit of some Estonian troops had already been severely damaged, in Grasser's opinion.

[7] The small number of German Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers and shortage of aircraft fuel gave the Soviets massive air superiority.

[2][7] Grasser's conclusion was short:[2][7] The Army Detachment emphasizes that the situation is extremely intense and the great difference between ours and the enemy's forces demands the greatest attention from the High Command.Leaving diplomatic formulation aside, Grasser announced that without immediate reinforcements, the Soviets would inevitably break through the Tannenberg Line on 29 June.

The commander of the Army Group, Ferdinand Schörner, had repeatedly called Adolf Hitler's attention to the fact that virtually no division consisting of Germans was left at the Tannenberg Line, which was threatening to collapse.

The Soviet Air Force and artillery covered the German positions with bombs and shells, destroying most of the forest on the hills.

[7] At a point occupied by the German 11th Infantry Division near the borough of Sirgala in the south, the Soviet tanks aimed to break through.

While having a great psychological effect, the "Katyushas" or so-called "Stalin organs" were inaccurate, causing little damage to the well-dug-in German troops.

[7] With artillery fire preventing reinforcements being sent in from the German rear, the Soviet 8th Army went on the attack and drove a wedge into the north flank of the 11th Infantry Division.

[7] The central command post was destroyed by Soviet fire while the Germans, Flemish, Norwegians and Estonians escaped destruction by lying down in their bunkers.

The two assaults by Maitla's improvised platoon at the Orphanage Hill forced the Soviets to refrain from further attacks and gave the Germans time to regroup.

[4] On 31 July the Soviet command changed the direction of its preparatory artillery fire, this time aiming it behind the hill and cutting off the German defenders from the main army group.

[5] Receiving the order from Stalin to break through to Tallinn at all costs, Govorov made Fedyuninsky responsible for reaching Rakvere no later than 7 August.

The men of Nederland who survived the artillery bombardment, retreated down the slopes of the Grenadier Hill pursued by the Soviet units.

[20] When the artillery barrage ended, the freshly drafted II.Battalion, Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment der SS 46 (2nd Estonian) returned fire after inflicting severe casualties on the assaulting Soviets and counterattacked, reclaiming the Grenadier Hill.

[5][7] On 3 August, the Soviets made a stronger attempt with the preparatory artillery fire of 25,000–30,000 shells reaching the level of the attack of 29 July.

[7] As the commanders of the rifle corps erroneously reported to army headquarters on the capture of the Grenadier Hill, the artillery fire was lifted.

The defenders used this respite to rotate several exhausted units out of the line for a few days for rest and refit, and to strengthen their positions.

Unable to hold the force, the German units withdrew towards the northwest while the incomplete II Army Corps was left to stall the Soviet attack.

Some of the Estonian formations now began to attack the retreating Germans, attempting to secure supplies and weapons to continue a guerrilla war as the Forest Brothers against the Soviet occupation.

These units continued fighting, some survivors joining the guerrilla groups which fought the Soviet occupying forces until the end of the 1970s.

View from the summit of the Grenadier Hill towards the Orphanage Hill
German soldier equipped with a Panzerschreck in August 1944
1949 photo showing the extent of damage to the once forested approach to the hills of Sinimäed . Disabled Panzer IV in the foreground.