With this movement the route to Tordesillas —headquarters of the Junta and residence of Queen Joanna the Mad— was left unprotected, so the royal army took advantage of the occasion and on December 4 headed out.

Deeply divided, with scarce numbers, and fearing reprisals from the comuneros within their fiefdoms, they limited themselves to establishing garrisons in some strategic places, after which they discharged most of the troops and returned to their domains.

At the end of November 1520 the Captain General of the Santa Junta, Pedro Girón y Velasco,[note 1] mobilized the bulk of his army towards Villabrágima, at the same time that other smaller detachments occupied Villafrechós, to the north, Tordehumos, to the southwest and Villagarcía de Campos and Urueña, to the south.

They only limited themselves to impede the enemy's advance and cut their lines of communication by occupying towns such as Mota del Marqués, San Pedro de Latarce, Castromonte or Torrelobatón.

The nobles, on the other hand, saw this position as very risky because the enemy was solidly entrenched in Villabrágima and because, in addition, the vineyards on the left bank of the Sequillo River were impassable terrain for the cavalry, on which their forces were mainly based, but perfect for the rebels' infantry.

Equally revealing are the declarations of Admiral Fadrique Enríquez de Velasco —since September Viceroy of Castile along with Adrian and the Constable—, who rejected the idea of fighting in his own fiefdom, on the banks and plain of the Rioseco.

[6] Obviously, the troops of Antonio de Fonseca —licensed in August after the fire of Medina del Campo— and the urban militias could not be counted on, either because they were under the control of the rebels or because there was a certain reluctance to make the loyal cities fight with their brethren.

The comunero army was made up mainly of urban militias contributed by the cities most committed to the movement: Valladolid (where all the males between eighteen and sixty years of age were mobilized), Toledo, Segovia, etc.

[8] Together with these forces (which by November had been organized and paid their salaries), there was also the other part of the Djerba veterans, who had accepted to join Pedro Girón through the emissary Carlos Arellano, as well as the peculiar battalion of Antonio de Acuña, bishop of Zamora, made up of around 300 armed priests.

The situation continued until December 2, when the rebel army began to abandon its positions in Villabrágima and moved towards Villalpando, the locality of the Constable, which surrendered the following day without resistance.

[11] Three hours later the Count of Haro appeared with the rest of the men and by means of a king of arms, two trumpets and a secretary of the admiral[12] addressed to the city an ultimatum, which the comuneros asked for a time limit to answer.

The Count insisted with a new request but as this time the answer was negative, at half past three in the afternoon, after an intense artillery fire, he gave the order to begin the assault.

Captain Suero del Águila, for his part, came quickly from Alaejos with 100 lances, but the enemy's army was too superior to face it effectively without Pedro Girón's forces.

[17] There is some controversy among historians when it comes to determine if with his movement from Villabrágima to Villalpando the captain of the comunero army, Pedro Girón, intended to betray the rebel cause or simply ignored the error at the time of committing it.

The first refers that Antonio de Acuña —the famous bishop from Zamora— and Girón were having dinner together with the Admiral and the Count of Benavente in Villabrágima when these two gentlemen pretended to join the side of the Junta, thus encouraging the comunero leaders to go against the Constable and attack Villalpando.

In fact, the chronicler is surprised that Acuña —who was not part of the plot— would have agreed to his colleague's military maneuver: And Don Pedro Giron took up residence in the houses of the Constable, his uncle.

What is frightening is that the bishop of Zamora (who was not in the deal), did not give in to it, but was always so black and hard, that it cost him his life, losing it miserably tied to a stick.But the name most cited in these debates is undoubtedly that of Antonio de Guevara.

And what is more, once the maneuver was completed, the military leaders of the royalist army continued to doubt about the conduct to follow, whether to recover the fief of the Constable or to attack Tordesillas.

In fact, all the Coetano testimonies agree, to the surprise of the royal power, that the defeat served to further inflame the rebels, who began to indignantly denounce the conduct of the nobility and some of them, the most radical, to show a certain willingness to invade their fiefs.

Alongside the admiral, who did not hide his hatred for the Royal Council, were grouped those in favor of a negotiated solution to the conflict; the defenders of the iron fist, on the other hand, were concentrated on the side of the Constable.

There was simply not enough money to maintain a large shock force, nor even to pay the troops the arrears owed to them.I [Santillán] made a infantryman dig through some walls with a hoe that I gave him.