Russian and South Ossetian victory GeorgiaFewer than total war casualtiesGeorgian Armed Forces: Ministry of Internal Affairs: RussiaFewer than total war casualties South OssetiaFewer than total war casualties Ministry of Defence: Ministry of Internal Affairs: Ossetian reserves: Abkhazia Georgia Uncontested Georgia The Battle of Tskhinvali (Georgian: ცხინვალის ბრძოლა; Russian: Бои за Цхинвали) was a fight for the city of Tskhinvali, the capital of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia.
By 11 August, all Georgian troops had left South Ossetia and Russian forces advanced into undisputed Georgia facing no resistance.
[26] Chief of Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, Zaza Gogava, told the Georgian parliamentary commission in October 2008 that Saakashvili told him on the secure line at 23:35 on 7 August that "developments went beyond all the limits" and issued orders to stop the ongoing invasion by Russian military hardware, to neutralise Ossetian artillery positions and to defend the civilians.
It was Russia that began deployment of the 58th Army in the Dzau District to accumulate weaponry in preparation for the future occupation of Georgia and ordered separatists in Tskhinvali to open fire to divert Georgians' attention, but Georgian president dared to attack the invading Russian troops and take Tskhinvali, thus subverting the Russian Blitzkrieg.
[28] According to Russian analyst Konstantin Makienko, founder of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), the Georgian objective was "a rapid destruction of the Ossetian armed forces and a lightning capture of the republic's capital city of Tskhinvali — well before the Russian army could have a chance to intervene" and to establish a pro-Georgian regime in Tskhinvali with Dmitry Sanakoyev as its head.
In anticipation of a Georgian operation, South Ossetia had deployed the bulk of its force to protect the town of Java in the north, which had left Tskhinvali sparsely defended.
[10] Former Chief of the General Staff of Russia Yuri Baluyevsky admitted in 2012 that the plan for the war with Georgia had been created in advance before August 2008 with the blessing of Vladimir Putin.
According to Baluyevsky, the Russian military had chosen South Ossetia as the site for the armed conflict by the summer 2008 and the date of hostilities "was defined from July to September" mostly to coincide with the Beijing Olympic Games.
According to the CAST, the Georgian tanks began firing at 6:30 and a Russian peacekeeper along with a South Ossetian spectator present on the roof were killed.
According to Russian government, it suffered its first casualties at around 12:00 when two servicemen were killed and five injured following an attempt by the Georgian troops to storm the northern peacekeeping base in Tskhinvali.
Individual groups began securing positions on the road towards Tskhinvali so additional Russian forces would enter the region unimpeded.
[7] In December 2008, former Secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council Anatoly Barankevich told Kommersant that Russian aviation bombed Tskhinvali during the battle with the Georgian forces.
In effect, the Russian military command was forced to bring motor-rifle units into battle from the march, without first gaining superiority in numbers and firepower.
The Georgian warplanes still posed a threat for the Russians by 11 August due to Russia not achieving air superiority, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
According to Kommersant, the Russian armored hardware had been stationed near the South Ossetian border in Alagirsky District for the past few weeks.
[74] At around 4:00 AM on 9 August, a Russian unit managed to arrive at the southern base of the peacekeepers and started to defend it against Georgians until late afternoon.
[82] Several battalions of Russian troops brought into the battle were making slow progress through the narrow Roki Tunnel and along the mountain roads.
[9] On 9 August, a 30 vehicles strong convoy led by Russia's 58th Army commander Lieutenant General Anatoly Khrulyov moved into Tskhinvali from the Roki Tunnel and got shelled by artillery and tanks near the entrance of the town.
[84][85] While the main offensive failed due to counterattacks and air raids which took out communication, the Georgian special forces proceeded in systematically decimating the trapped Russian convoy.
[87][88] The trapped Russian units avoided complete destruction by splitting into smaller platoons and scattering, however reportedly 25 out of 30 vehicles of that vanguard force were destroyed.
However, Moscow Defense Brief writes: ... "on this very day the accumulation of Russian forces in the region finally bore fruit, and the fighting in South Ossetia reached a turning point.
What thwarted the Georgian operation in the end was not the Russian Air Force, but the resistance offered by peacekeepers and lightly armed, poorly organized South Ossetian units that stayed behind to defend the capital.
[9][93] An hour-long engagement took place in the village of Shindisi on 11 August between the Georgian convoy of the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade and the Russian forces near the railway station.
[94][95][96] South Ossetian government representative claimed on 11 August that Georgian troops opened the irrigation canal to flood basements in Tskhinvali and prevent civilians from seeking shelter.
[91] In December 2008, the figures were revised down to a total of 162 South Ossetian casualties by the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation.
[105] Several journalists were reported on 11 August 2008 to be among the casualties,[106] including the two, who were embedded with the ambushed Russian armoured column, in which General Khrulyov was wounded.
[112] Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Emergency Situations of Russia, announced that Radio and TV stations would begin broadcasting in Tskhinvali on 14 August and newspapers would be published.
[113] Ukrainian journalist Ruslan Yarmolyuk working for Inter TV channel described the days spent during the war in Tskhinvali on 14 August 2008.
[120][121] South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity said in an interview in December 2008 that as soon as Tskhinvali was attacked on 8 August 2008, he established a contact with the Chief of the General Staff of Russia and Commander of the North Caucasus Military District.
[124] In January 2009, Human Rights Watch issued the report which stated that Georgian forces used Grad multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled artillery, mortars and howitzers against South Ossetian targets during the initial phase of the conflict.