Strict German adherence to defensive doctrine, as well as strong and effective counterattacks by Panzer formations, resulted in many Allied casualties for little tactical gain.

[1] From the perspective of the First Canadian Army, the battle is remembered for its tactical and strategic miscalculations—the most notable being a highly controversial attack by The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada on 25 July, in which 315 of its 325 soldiers were killed, wounded or captured.

Although an important D-Day objective for Commonwealth forces, the Allied push inland was halted short of Caen and positional warfare ensued until the first week of July.

[5] On 9 July, Operation Charnwood captured the northern half of the city but the I SS Panzer Corps maintained defensive positions in the remainder of Caen.

[9] The Canadian II Corps (Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds) assigned two infantry divisions and one armoured brigade to the assault on the German positions around Verrières.

[9][14][15] While British forces had been attacking Caen, elements of the I SS Panzer Corps, part of Army Group B (Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge) had turned Verrières Ridge into their main defensive position along the Anglo-Canadian front.

[1] In a follow-up to Operation Goodwood on 19 July, the Calgary Highlanders attempted to take the northern spur of Verrières Ridge but German mortar fire limited their progress.

[4] Simonds rapidly prepared a new offensive for the following day, with the goals of capturing both the eastern side of the Orne river and the main slopes of Verrières Ridge.

[4][20] At the same time, the South Saskatchewan Regiment moved directly up the slopes of Verrières Ridge, supported by tanks and Hawker Typhoon ground attack aircraft.

[17] Minor counter-attacks by both battalions on 21 July managed to contain Dietrich's armoured formations and by the time the operation was called off, Canadian forces held several footholds on the ridge, including a now secure position on Point 67.

[24] Spring was originally conceived by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery as a "holding attack", designed to tie down German forces while Cobra was under way.

[3] Very few members of the Black Watch Regiment managed to make it to the crest of the ridge and those who did were subjected to an even heavier bombardment as they ran into the counter-attacking forces of the 272nd Infantry Division and the 9th SS Kampfgruppe Sterz.

[27][34] The east side was also taken, but subsequently lost, although two British armoured brigades were able to secure significant footholds near the positions of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry.

[33][36] With German defences weakened, subsequent Commonwealth attacks on the ridge were successful; Operation Totalize finally managed to wrest the position from its SS defenders on 8 August.

Stacey attributes this to the gradual degradation of the German logistics chain, leaving incomplete records, and Reynolds wrote that units sometimes over-reported their losses, in the hope of receiving more reinforcements.

[42] The report on Operation Spring by Simonds was released after the war and blamed its failure on "11th hour reinforcement" of German lines and "strategically unsound execution on the part of Major Phillip Griffin and the Black Watch".

[43] Declassified wartime documents show that Simonds, along with several others in the Allied high command, had likely been notified on 23 July of a massive German build-up on the ridge.

[17][33] Terry Copp and John A. English wrote that given the amount of pressure under which all Allied commanders were to break out from Normandy, Simonds probably had little choice in the decision he made.

[37][48] The Battle of Verrières Ridge had little overall effect on British attempts to break out of Caen, as significant resources were transferred to the American front in the aftermath of Cobra to exploit Bradley's success.