The objective was to draw German reserves away from the French forces, preparing for a crucial offensive along the Aisne and the Chemin des Dames ridge several days later.

Historians attribute the success of the Canadian Corps to technical and tactical innovation, meticulous planning, powerful artillery support and extensive training, as well as the inability of the 6th Army to properly apply the new German defensive doctrine.

[6] The French Tenth Army attempted to dislodge the Germans from the region during the Second Battle of Artois in May 1915 by attacking their positions at Vimy Ridge and Notre Dame de Lorette.

[18] The final objective of the northern flank was the Red Line, taking the highest point on the ridge, the fortified knoll known as the Pimple, la Folie Farm, the Zwischen-Stellung (intermediate position) and the hamlet of Les Tilleuls.

[22] The experience of the Battle of the Somme led the German command to conclude that the policy of rigidly defending a trench position was no longer effective against the firepower that the Entente armies had accumulated.

Their defensive scheme was to maintain a front line defence of sufficient strength to withstand an initial assault and move operational reserves forward, before the enemy could consolidate their gains or overrun the remaining German positions.

The First Army Field Survey Company printed barrage maps for all batteries, produced artillery boards and provided counter-battery support with their flash spotting groups and sound ranging sections.

[43] Using flash spotting, sound ranging and aerial reconnaissance from 16 Squadron and 1 & 2 Balloon Companies Royal Flying Corps (RFC) in the week before the battle, the counter-battery artillery under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew McNaughton fired 125,900 shells, harassing an estimated 83 per cent of the German gun positions.

[21] Coupled with the observations and suggestions made by Currie in the report he submitted in January 1917 following the Verdun lectures, the Canadian Corps instilled the tactical change with vigour.

At the First Army headquarters, a large plasticine model of the Vimy sector was constructed and used to show commissioned and senior non-commissioned officers the topographical features of the battlefield and details of the German trench system.

[42] Upwards of 40,000 topographical trench maps were printed and distributed to ensure that even platoon sergeants and section commanders possessed a wider awareness of the battlefield.

[47] The new measures gave each platoon a clearer picture of how it fitted into the greater battle plan and in so doing, reduced the command problems that plagued First World War operations.

In the second half of 1916, the British constructed strong defensive underground positions and from August 1916, the Royal Engineers developed a mining scheme for a big infantry attack on the Vimy Ridge proposed for autumn 1916, although this was postponed.

The Canadians considered activities such as artillery observation and photography of opposing trench systems, troop movements and gun emplacements essential to continue their offensive.

The task was made more dangerous with the arrival of German air reinforcements, including the highly experienced and well-equipped Jasta 11 which led to a sharp increase in RFC losses.

[71] Despite the losses suffered by the RFC, the Luftstreitkräfte failed to prevent the British from carrying out its priority, air support of the army during the Battle of Arras with up-to-date aerial photographs and other reconnaissance information.

[73] However, a division of Gruppe Souchez, under VIII Reserve Corps General of the Infantry Georg Karl Wichura, was involved in the frontline defence along the northernmost portion of the ridge.

The 4th Canadian Division was responsible for the northern portion of the advance that included the capture of the highest point of the ridge, followed by the elaborately fortified Pimple just west of the village of Givenchy-en-Gohelle.

Byng planned for a healthy reserve for contingencies that included the relief of forward troops, help in consolidating positions and aiding the 4th Canadian Division with the capture of the Pimple.

[77][78] General of Infantry Ernst August Marx von Bachmeister, commanding the German 79th Reserve Division, reported in late March that he believed the Canadian Corps was moving into an echelon formation and were preparing for a big attack.

[79][80] The Germans quickly planned Operation Munich (Unternehmen München), a spoiling attack to capture the northern section of the Zouave Valley, along the northernmost portion of the Canadian front.

Persistent attacks eventually forced the German troops holding the southwestern portion of Hill 145 to withdraw after they ran out of ammunition, mortar rounds, and grenades.

[111] To permit the troops time to consolidate the Blue Line, the advance halted and the barrage remained stationary for 90 minutes while machine guns were brought forward.

[117] The Pimple was initially defended by the 16th Bavarian Infantry Division but the Canadian Corps' preliminary artillery bombardment leading up to the assault on 9 April caused heavy casualties amongst its ranks.

[122] Following the defeat, the chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, ordered Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, Supreme Army Command) to conduct a court of enquiry into the defensive collapse of the Arras sector.

The court concluded that the 6th Army headquarters had disregarded reports from commanders in the front line noting a possible imminent attack and reserve units were too distant to counter-attack before the Canadians could consolidate.

[132] According to Pierce, "The historical reality of the battle has been reworked and reinterpreted in a conscious attempt to give purpose and meaning to an event that came to symbolize Canada's coming of age as a nation".

[133] That Canadian national identity and nationhood were born out of the battle is an opinion that in the late twentieth century became widely held in military and general histories of Canada.

[134][135] McKay and Swift contend that the theory that Vimy Ridge is a source of Canada's rise as a nation is highly contested and developed in the latter part of the twentieth century after most of those who experienced the Great War had died but in 1919 Hopkins had attributed to F.A.

The unveiling was conducted on 26 July 1936, by King Edward VIII accompanied by President Lebrun of France and a crowd of over 50,000 people, including at least 6,200 Canadian veterans and their families.