[3][4] Pushed by regional British Commander-in-Chief Sir John Nixon, General Fenton Aylmer launched an attack against Ottoman defensive positions on the banks of the Wadi River.

The 28th Indian Brigade of the 7th (Meerut) Division under Brigadier General George Kemball would attack the Wadi trenches frontally, while the rest of the Tigris Corps moved around the flank.

[7][9] Meanwhile, the Ottoman army, under new regional commander Halil Pasha, set up new and firmer defensive positions—with some 20,000 troops—along the banks of the smaller Wadi River, through which the British would have to pass to reach Kut.

[5] The attack, which began in the early afternoon of 13 January—postponed from the morning because of a persistent mist and a slow advance by artillery across the river—quickly lost the intended element of surprise, as the outnumbered British forces on both sides of enemy lines struggled to assert themselves against a robust Ottoman defense.

[11] The delay seriously affected the chances of success, as small-arms and artillery fire from the alerted Ottoman forces began to halt the British infantry movements.

[10] By this time, Aylmer's troops had gained control of the Wadi, but it was a small advance that was unworthy of the 1,600 men killed or wounded (including 40 British officers) in the attack and did little to bring relief closer to Townshend's beleaguered forces at Kut.

[5][11] The provision of adequate medical capacity and supplies had not improved significantly since the appalling debacle at Sheikh Sa'ad, so again many casualties suffered without treatment or evacuation for several days.

The Ottoman government was forced to end its military operations in Persia and try to build up a new army to prevent the British from moving on to capture of Mosul.