After the Mareth Line in southern Tunisia had been outflanked in Operation Supercharge II, through the Tebaga Gap, Axis forces had withdrawn to the Wadi Akarit, north of Gabès.

Rommel had wanted to withdraw there after the Second Battle of El Alamein, as it was the best place to resist the Eighth Army and prolong the Axis presence in Africa.

The approaches to Djebel er Roumana were obstructed by an anti-tank ditch and there were more defence works to the west, although the broken ground was a significant obstacle.

[6] Eighth Army had spent the previous week regrouping ready for the assault whilst the enemy was pounded almost continually by British and American air forces.Instead of attacking between Jebel Fatnassa, a steep 800-foot (240 m) hill and the junction with the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, Major-General Francis Tuker, the 4th Indian Division commander, persuaded General Montgomery to attack Jebel Fatnassa using infantry trained in mountain warfare.

It was no time for pussy footing, we were intoxicated with rage and had to kill them to pay for our fallen pal.The Green Howards took Point 85 and held it against counter-attacks.

[11] The 51st (Highland) Division attacked with the 152nd Brigade and seized the top of Roumana, then made a gap through the minefield and the anti tank ditch on the left flank.

There was little resistance until close to Enfidaville and about 6,000 prisoners were taken, sometimes surprised to see Allied troops beyond the supposed front line and large amounts of material (including captured American supplies) were taken.

The Axis troops fell back to defensible positions north and west of Enfidaville, 25 miles (40 km) south of Cape Bon.

The area was held until the Axis surrender in North Africa and Eighth Army units were moved towards Medjez el Bab opposite Tunis, for the final operations of the Tunisian Campaign.