This battle was part of the broader military operations defending the Great Union during the Romanian Army's efforts to occupy the demarcation line [ro] in Transylvania in the Hungarian–Romanian War.

[2] The French general Louis Franchet d'Espèrey appreciated that, in the context in which the final goal of the Romanians was to occupy territories in accordance with those recorded in the secret treaty from Bucharest, a Romanian-Hungarian war was imminent.

The only tangible results were represented by those of the Székely Division which, despite serious financial and disciplinary problems, had nevertheless constituted troops capable of opposing the Romanian advance.

The same historian mentioned that, according to the documents of the Hungarian Military Command from Transylvania, there was also the active participation of some of the Romanian soldiers of the regiments in the city in these acts.

[9] ...On the other hand the Romanian military command will take the harshest measures against the perpetrators, regardless of nationality...Through three successive ordinances signed by Major Gheorghe Rozin [ro][C] (the local commander in Zalău) the movement of citizens after 11 p.m. starting on January 19, 1919, was prohibited, shops were ordered to open and public gatherings in groups were prohibited larger than three people, as well as handing over any weaponry and military material to the Romanian troops within 24 hours.

[9] All the more so as among the Hungarian soldiers of the battalion led by Major Gyurotsik there were some (among whom Gyurotsik himself was) who had family members in the Zalău area and as such they had been subjected to direct threats ,[D] the news about the situation in which the civilian population of Zalău had been put in the period following the occupation of the locality by the Romanian troops contributed to the destabilization of the military situation, testing the psyche of the Hungarian soldiers beyond the line of demarcation.

On February 20, 1918, from the Romanian command of the 7th Infantry Division came the express request that the Hungarian troops withdraw ten kilometers behind the demarcation line, thus leaving a neutral zone between them and the respective alignment.

The two specified that the battles fought until that moment showed that the resistance that the Romanian troops could oppose was not significant, and the use of strong attack forces could lead to quick results.

At that time, the 1st Battalion of the 12th Honvéd Infantry Regiment was stationed in the direction of Zalău, supported by an artillery battery, which was to be added to close the access to the city.

Being a day's march from the city, the troops of the 32 Honvéd Infantry Regiment should have pushed forward secretly on the Sălaj River valley to shorten the time of their entry into action, so that the Romanians cannot bring reinforcements.

The attack would have been carried out in two columns, one of which would move along the Sărmășag – Jibou railway and the second in the direction of Nadișu Hododului – Chilioara – Sâncraiu Silvaniei – Șoimuș.

Along with Major Gyurotsik, a total of 50 soldiers and 9 officers with 2 machine guns chose to retreat with the Hungarian troops, to join the 32 Honvéd Infantry Regiment.

Gyurotsik was also ordered to recruit soldiers so that his subunit would reach the strength of a battalion, as well as to supervise the activity of the Romanians in Șimleu Silvaniei through a detachment of riflemen.

The "Gyurotsik Detachment" received the designation 2nd Battalion and was operationally subordinated to the 24th Honvéd Infantry Regiment from Șimleu Silvaniei, a unit under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ferenc Schuppler.

According to his plan, the column that was supposed to start from Hereclean on the left wing was to move towards Crișeni, to occupy the northern foothills of the Meseș Mountains, which the city of Zalău dominates.

Consequently, he asked the 1st Battalion from the 12th Honvéd Regiment, located in Crasna, to enter the battle by moving through Mirsid towards Jibou, in case Zalău was conquered.

Comparing both plans, that of Gyurotsik and the one made by the command of the Székely Division, it stands out that the invasion of Jibo would have been allowed only by a particularly fortunate circumstance and that there was no real chance to this city would be preserved.

Later, since they did not encounter any enemy troops until the dawn of February 23, they also returned to Hereclean, where Major Gyurotsik was organizing the reserves for the defense of the main position, which was essential for the maintenance of Zalău.

In the south, the column starting from Recea fragmented in three directions: the left wing [F] advanced towards Zalău and then towards the ridge of the mountain; the [G] center passed through Aghireș, putting the Romanian soldiers from here to flight after a short battle.

[14]All this time, Major Gyurotsik was in limbo, only on February 23 at 9 o'clock in the morning after the fog had lifted, could he see the flag raised in the tower of the place of worship.

Since, after the death of the officer in charge of the detachment that was supposed to reach Mirsid, there was no one to replace him, Gyurotsik had to stay to organize the reserve troops from Hereclean in the defense of that point, crucial to be able to be preserved the locality of Zalău.

No one organized them to complete the action.On February 24, the Romanian military sent parliamentarians to Zalău, at the same time taking note of the weakness of the Hungarian forces, as well as of the existing conditions in the locality.

The Romanian parliamentarians requested the immediate evacuation of the city and the unconditional release of the prisoners taken by the Hungarians, the commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment also setting a deadline for this.

The addition of the new subunit to the action did not improve the situation much, because from Meseș the Romanian artillery began to hit the city, to force the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops.

On February 25, at 8 o'clock, Lieutenant Kovácsy's company was attacked in the area of the station by clearly superior Romanian forces, estimated by him at several battalions, which is why the subunit gradually retreated and in the afternoon returned to its departure position.

The troops of the 1st Battalion from the 24th Honvéd Regiment maintained their position during the day, being withdrawn to the hills in the western vicinity of the city only on February 26, as a result of the intense bombardment and their attack by superior forces.

The difficulty of conquering the locality by the Romanian Army was increased, however, by the fact that part of its ethnic Hungarian population made an active contribution to the defense.

Regarding the balance sheet of the action initiated by Gyurotsik, we must put, on the one hand, the material and image damage caused to the Romanian troops, along with the fact that, finally, the families of the Hungarian officers threatened by the Romanian command with retaliatory measures - involved in the appearance of the motivation of the action - they escaped, and, on the other hand, the entire level of problems generated at the moment, or as a later effect, for the rest of the civilian population of Zalău and the city itself.

[8] A large number of refugees appeared among the Hungarians in the city, withdrawn for fear of reprisals[8] and point towards the area under the control of the Székely Division, beyond the demarcation line.

They were speculated by the Hungarian propaganda organs, which claimed[15] (according to the opinion of Alexandru-Bogdan Kürti, distorting the truth) that their result would have been the filling streets of dead and wounded, and the town would have been savagely destroyed.