[5] Another problem was that the hope of creating local superiority, in certain points of the front, was lost because of the defeat in the Battle of Káty of General Mór Perczel, which prevented him to send in support Hungarian troops from southern Hungary, as the initial operational plan stated.

[5] Although in that region the terrain was rugged, which could make the advance slower, but also made it more difficult for the Austrians to implement their numerical superiority.

corps, which after sending forward, at 6:00 a.m., its vanguard from Tardoskedd and Tótmegyer to Vágsellye, with the intention of diverting the attention of the Austrians, had to advance from Érsekújvár, through Szemő, to Vágfarkasd.

The officers from the Central Operational Bureau which elaborated it, were not aware of the fact that between the Vág and the Little Danube, the terrain is very marshy, and because of this only the ramparts could be used to go from one village to another.

[7] Another problem was that the commanders of the three corps which had to be involved in this offensive had to operate on their own, far from each other, and Görgei, who was supposed to coordinate them, could not be there, because he was in Pest, fulfilling his ministerial duties.

From here the Kisfaludy brigade of the division crossed the Érsekújvár branch of the Danube, occupying Seregakol, in order to cover the bridge-building from Aszódpuszta.

On 14 June Asbóth sent the Csúzy brigade reinforced, probably by cavalry, on reconnaissance by combat towards Vásárút, which was occupied from the Derschatta detachment of the Austrian II.

[10] For this, that night, a detachment crossed to the northern shore of the Danube at Gúta, in order to advance on the causeway, occupy Negyed and Vágfarkasd, and start to build a bridge for the III.

For the protection of the bridge from Aszódpuszta he left behind the Csúzy brigade, reinforced with mainly artillery pieces, but also with some cavalry units.

But around noon Rezsni started a counter-attack, and with the help of the Bocskai detachment, they caught Grobois between two fires, forcing him to retreat westwards, towards Tallós.

[18] The Hungarian main column led by Colonel Lajos Asbóth arrived in the vicinity of Zsigárd around 10:30 a.m., where they took the battle position.

[17] On the Austrian side, Major General Gustav Ritter von Pott deployed his troops leaning his left wing on Zsigárd, fortified by an entrenchment.

They tried to prevent the Hungarian Infantry's deployment, but when the twice numerous Magyar artillery started to shoot, the situation changed completely.

[17] The skillfully led Hungarian cannons blew up an enemy ammunition wagon, then caused immense damage both to the Austrian artillery and infantry.

[17] Profiting on this, Asbóth sent the 3 companies of Württemberg hussars and the cavalry battery from his left wing to encircle the enemy, and when Pott saw that the Austrian Liechtenstein chevau-légers were not able to prevent this, he ordered the retreat.

[17] After this Asbóth contented himself with this success, stopped the pursuit of the retreating enemy, and for more than two hours confined himself, to the defense of Zsigárd, sending only recon patrols in the region.

[17] But if he would have pursued Pott's brigade, he could have easily capture Pered, then with his cavalry and artillery superiority, he could have crushed it before the arrival of the reinforcements led by Herzinger.

[18] Early afternoon the situation changed because the Herzinger detachment arrived on the battlefield from the direction of Deáki, which joined the Pott brigade, and now the k.u.k.

[18] Facing the 12 enemy artillery pieces, the 5 Hungarian cannons tried to do their best to compensate their numerical inferiority by shooting as many projectiles as they could, but as the consequence of this they quickly exhausted all their ammunition, so they had to retreat from the battlefield.

[18] Their arrival forced the Pott brigade to return to the village, and secure it against an eventual counter-attack,[20] because Herzinger believed that the whole Hungarian III.

[8] If the Austrians would have pursued them with full strength, they could crush totally the Hungarians, caught between two water flows (the Vág and the Dudvág).

corps departed from Nagymegyer with 4 battalions, 3 cavalry companies, and 8 cannons towards Csilizpatas and Bős, and attacked, at 7:00 a.m., the Austrian Reischach brigade which was positioned there.

The battle started with a cannonade, followed by the counterattack of the Reischach brigade, which pushed back Kosztolányi's troops to Patas and from there to Nagymegyer, where he stopped the pursuit of the retreating Hungarians.

[8] First the division occupied the heights east of Sempte, then, from there it started to bombard the entrenchments in front of the village, managing to overpower the k.u.k.

[8] To make the taste of the defeat more bitter, the Koudelka battalion managed to reach from behind and capture 4 Hungarian twelve-pounder cannons.

According to their reports, the Pott brigade and the Herzinger detachment lost together 206 soldiers and 5 officers, 50 horses, 3 cannons, and an ammunition wagon.

One was the Hungarian Central Operational Bureau because of its rigid plan, based on the underestimation of the enemy's capacity to mobilize its reserves, the second was General Knezić's lack of initiative, and the third was Asbóth himself.

[3] After the battle, Asbóth gathered his scattered soldiers, he recommended those who distinguished themselves for decoration and removed those officers who did not fulfill their duties, as he expected from them.

[22] Meanwhile, his scouts managed to gather enough information about the size of the Austrian troops in the region, as a result of which, he felt that they are not too strong, and he can defeat them with a new attack.

(Reserve) corps, Lieutenant General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth sent to Pered on 19 June the other half of the Theissing brigade, reinforced by some cavalry.